[PATCH v2 11/12] ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.ibm.com
Thu Sep 17 14:25:08 UTC 2020
Hi Roberto,
On Fri, 2020-09-04 at 11:26 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> With the patch to accept EVM portable signatures when the
> appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy, appraisal can
> be successfully done even if the file does not have an IMA signature.
>
> However, remote attestation would not see that a different signature type
> was used, as only IMA signatures can be included in the measurement list.
> This patch solves the issue by introducing the new template field 'evmsig'
> to show EVM portable signatures and by including its value in the existing
> field 'sig' if the IMA signature is not found.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
> Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.ibm.com>
Thank you! Just a minor comment below.
<snip>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> index c022ee9e2a4e..2c596c2a89cc 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
>
> @@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
>
> if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
> - return 0;
> + return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data);
>
> return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,
> DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data);
> @@ -484,3 +485,39 @@ int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> return ima_write_template_field_data(data, data_len, DATA_FMT_HEX,
> field_data);
> }
> +
> +/*
> + * ima_eventevmsig_init - include the EVM portable signature as part of the
> + * template data
> + */
> +int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> + struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> +{
> + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + if (!event_data->file)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!(file_inode(event_data->file)->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(file_dentry(event_data->file), XATTR_NAME_EVM,
> + (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
> + if (rc <= 0) {
> + if (!rc || rc == -ENODATA)
> + return 0;
> +
> + return rc;
We're including the EVM signature on a best effort basis to help with
attestation. Do we really care why it failed? Are we going to act on
it?
Mimi
> + }
> +
> + if (xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
> + kfree(xattr_data);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + rc = ima_write_template_field_data((char *)xattr_data, rc, DATA_FMT_HEX,
> + field_data);
> + kfree(xattr_data);
> + return rc;
> +}
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