[PATCH 2/3] integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
Andy Shevchenko
andy.shevchenko at gmail.com
Wed Sep 2 07:55:21 UTC 2020
On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 6:45 AM Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi at redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Move the loading of certs from the UEFI MokListRT into a separate
> routine to facilitate additional MokList functionality.
>
> There is no visible functional change as a result of this patch.
> Although the UEFI dbx certs are now loaded before the MokList certs,
> they are loaded onto different key rings. So the order of the keys
> on their respective key rings is the same.
...
> /*
> + * load_moklist_certs() - Load MokList certs
> + *
> + * Returns: Summary error status
> + *
> + * Load the certs contained in the UEFI MokListRT database into the
> + * platform trusted keyring.
> + */
Hmm... Is it intentionally kept out of kernel doc format?
> +static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
> +{
> + efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
> + void *mok = NULL;
> + unsigned long moksize = 0;
> + efi_status_t status;
> + int rc = 0;
Redundant assignment (see below).
> + /* Get MokListRT. It might not exist, so it isn't an error
> + * if we can't get it.
> + */
> + mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
> + if (!mok) {
Why not positive conditional? Sometimes ! is hard to notice.
> + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> + pr_debug("MokListRT variable wasn't found\n");
> + else
> + pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
> + } else {
> + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
> + mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
> + if (rc)
> + pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
> + kfree(mok);
kfree(...)
if (rc)
...
return rc;
And with positive conditional there will be no need to have redundant
'else' followed by additional level of indentation.
> + }
> + return rc;
return 0;
> +}
P.S. Yes, I see that the above was in the original code, so, consider
my comments as suggestions to improve the code.
--
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko
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