[PATCH v7 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com
Tue Oct 13 11:59:18 UTC 2020
On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 04:23:36PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> On Tue, 13 Oct 2020 at 07:13, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 03:37:45PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > > Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> > > an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> > > like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> > > support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
> > >
> > > Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
> > > can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
> > > which contains necessary functions of a backend.
> > >
> > > Also, add a module parameter in order to select a particular trust source
> > > in case a platform support multiple trust sources.
> > >
> > > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg at linaro.org>
> >
> > This is exactly kind of place where I think static_call() should be
> > taken into use, which is a v5.10 feature [1]. For background and
> > context, I'd read [2].
>
> This looks like an interesting feature. But I am not sure about the
> real benefits that it will provide in case of trusted keys. If we are
> looking at it performance wise then I think the gain will be
> negligible when compared with slow TPM communication interface (eg.
> SPI, I2C) or when compared with context switching involved in TEE.
>
> Also, it requires arch specific support too which currently seems to
> be limited to x86 only.
Please, do not purposely add indirect calls, unless you must. Here it's
not a must.
static_call() is the correct kernel idiom to define what you are doing
in this patch. arch's will catch up.
> > The other thing that I see that does not make much else than additional
> > complexity, is trusted_tpm.ko. We can do with one trusted.ko.
> >
>
> Current implementation only builds a single trusted.ko module. There
> isn't any trusted_tpm.ko.
> -Sumit
You're right, I'm sorry. I misread this:
-static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+static void __exit exit_tpm_trusted(void)
{
if (chip) {
put_device(&chip->dev);
@@ -1257,7 +1029,11 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
}
}
-late_initcall(init_trusted);
-module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
-
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops = {
+ .migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */
+ .init = init_tpm_trusted,
+ .seal = tpm_trusted_seal,
+ .unseal = tpm_trusted_unseal,
+ .get_random = tpm_trusted_get_random,
+ .exit = exit_tpm_trusted,
+};
Please remove "__init" and "__exit" for the functions as they are used
as fields as members of a struct that has neither life span. That messed
up my head.
Please use a single convention for the function names. It would
be optimal to prefix with the subsystem name because that makes easier
to use tracing tools: trusted_tpm_<callback name> would work.
/Jarkko
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