[PATCH v3 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com
Tue Oct 13 02:39:27 UTC 2020
On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 05:58:04PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2020-10-13 at 03:28 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> [...]
> > diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> > index 8f4ff39f51e7..f0ebce14d2f8 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> > @@ -397,6 +397,10 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc)
> > #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
> >
> > extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> > +extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> > +extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> > +extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct
> > tpm_buf *buf,
> > + size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char
> > *desc);
> > extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> > struct tpm_digest *digest);
> > extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> > @@ -410,7 +414,18 @@ static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip
> > *chip)
> > {
> > return -ENODEV;
> > }
> > -
> > +static inline int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> > +{
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > +}
> > +static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct
> > tpm_buf *buf,
> > + size_t min_rsp_body_length,
> > const char *desc)
> > +{
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > +}
> > static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx,
>
> I don't think we want this, do we? That's only for API access which
> should be available when the TPM isn't selected. Given that get/put
> are TPM critical operations, they should only appear when inside code
> where the TPM has already been selected. If they appear outside TPM
> selected code, I think we want the compile to fail, which is why we
> don't want these backup definitions.
>
> James
OK, I'll change it.
Thanks.
/Jarkko
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