[PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] bpf: Add a selftest for bpf_ima_inode_hash
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.ibm.com
Wed Nov 25 03:01:04 UTC 2020
On Wed, 2020-11-25 at 03:55 +0100, KP Singh wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 25, 2020 at 3:20 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 2020-11-24 at 15:12 +0000, KP Singh wrote:
> > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/ima_setup.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/ima_setup.sh
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 000000000000..15490ccc5e55
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/ima_setup.sh
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
> > > +#!/bin/bash
> > > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > > +
> > > +set -e
> > > +set -u
> > > +
> > > +IMA_POLICY_FILE="/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy"
> > > +TEST_BINARY="/bin/true"
> > > +
> > > +usage()
> > > +{
> > > + echo "Usage: $0 <setup|cleanup|run> <existing_tmp_dir>"
> > > + exit 1
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +setup()
> > > +{
> > > + local tmp_dir="$1"
> > > + local mount_img="${tmp_dir}/test.img"
> > > + local mount_dir="${tmp_dir}/mnt"
> > > + local copied_bin_path="${mount_dir}/$(basename ${TEST_BINARY})"
> > > + mkdir -p ${mount_dir}
> > > +
> > > + dd if=/dev/zero of="${mount_img}" bs=1M count=10
> > > +
> > > + local loop_device="$(losetup --find --show ${mount_img})"
> > > +
> > > + mkfs.ext4 "${loop_device}"
> > > + mount "${loop_device}" "${mount_dir}"
> > > +
> > > + cp "${TEST_BINARY}" "${mount_dir}"
> > > + local mount_uuid="$(blkid -s UUID -o value ${loop_device})"
> > > + echo "measure func=BPRM_CHECK fsuuid=${mount_uuid}" > ${IMA_POLICY_FILE}
> >
> > Anyone using IMA, normally define policy rules requiring the policy
> > itself to be signed. Instead of writing the policy rules, write the
>
> The goal of this self test is to not fully test the IMA functionality but check
> if the BPF helper works and returns a hash with the minimal possible IMA
> config dependencies. And it seems like we can accomplish this by simply
> writing the policy to securityfs directly.
>
> From what I noticed, IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
> requires configuring a lot of other kernel options
> (IMA_APPRAISE, ASYMMETRIC_KEYS etc.) that seem
> like too much for bpf self tests to depend on.
>
> I guess we can independently add selftests for IMA which represent
> a more real IMA configuration. Hope this sounds reasonable?
Sure. My point was that writing the policy rule might fail.
Mimi
>
> > signed policy file pathname. Refer to dracut commit 479b5cd9
> > ("98integrity: support validating the IMA policy file signature").
> >
> > Both enabling IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS and the builtin
> > "appraise_tcb" policy require loading a signed policy.
>
> Thanks for the pointers.
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list