[PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.ibm.com
Mon Nov 23 19:49:10 UTC 2020
On Mon, 2020-11-23 at 18:18 +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > Basically every other data structure in kernel is "critical" by your
> > > definition, and you can't really measure them all; some of them change
> > > rather often. Going piecemeal does not really help here.
> >
> > Agreed, measuring data structures that change is not really applicable.
> > However, measuring data structures that once initialized don't change,
> > does make sense (similar concept to __ro_after_init). The attestation
> > server doesn't need to know anything about the measurement, other than
> > more than a single measurement is indicative of a problem.
>
> So, why not simply measure everything that is ro_after_init?
I guess we could, but the original discussion, a long time ago prior to
LSM stacking, was limited to measuring the LSM hooks.
Mimi
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