[PATCH bpf-next v7 4/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution
sds at tycho.nsa.gov
Fri Mar 27 13:43:45 UTC 2020
On 3/27/20 8:41 AM, KP Singh wrote:
> On 27-Mär 08:27, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 3/26/20 8:24 PM, James Morris wrote:
>>> On Thu, 26 Mar 2020, KP Singh wrote:
>>>> +int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
>>>> + const struct bpf_prog *prog)
>>>> + /* Only CAP_MAC_ADMIN users are allowed to make changes to LSM hooks
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
>>>> + return -EPERM;
>>> Stephen, can you confirm that your concerns around this are resolved
>>> (IIRC, by SELinux implementing a bpf_prog callback) ?
>> I guess the only residual concern I have is that CAP_MAC_ADMIN means
>> something different to SELinux (ability to get/set file security contexts
>> unknown to the currently loaded policy), so leaving the CAP_MAC_ADMIN check
>> here (versus calling a new security hook here and checking CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
>> the implementation of that hook for the modules that want that) conflates
>> two very different things. Prior to this patch, there are no users of
>> CAP_MAC_ADMIN outside of individual security modules; it is only checked in
>> module-specific logic within apparmor, safesetid, selinux, and smack, so the
>> meaning was module-specific.
> As we had discussed, We do have a security hook as well:
> The bpf_prog hook which can check for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM and implement
> module specific logic for LSM programs. I thougt that was okay?
> Kees was in favor of keeping the CAP_MAC_ADMIN check here:
> If you feel strongly and Kees agrees, we can remove the CAP_MAC_ADMIN
> check here, but given that we already have a security hook that meets
> the requirements, we probably don't need another one.
I would favor removing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN check here, and implementing it
in a bpf_prog hook for Smack and AppArmor if they want that. SELinux
would implement its own check in its existing bpf_prog hook.
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