[PATCH v2 06/11] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond

Lakshmi Ramasubramanian nramas at linux.microsoft.com
Sat Jun 27 23:39:08 UTC 2020


On 6/26/20 3:38 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings
> conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors
> don't assume that other conditionals are supported.
> 
> Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks at linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
> 
> * v2
>    - No change
> 
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++++
>   1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 676d5557af1a..f9b1bdb897da 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -1018,6 +1018,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>   			if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
>   				return false;
>   
> +			if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
> +					     IMA_KEYRINGS))
> +				return false;
> +
> +			if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
> +				return false;
> +
>   			break;
>   		default:
>   			return false;
> 

Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas at linux.microsoft.com>



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