[PATCH 12/12] ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
Tyler Hicks
tyhicks at linux.microsoft.com
Thu Jun 25 22:59:57 UTC 2020
On 2020-06-25 18:56:44, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-06-22 at 19:32 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> > Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
> > ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
> > the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
> > writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
> > and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.
> >
> > Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
> > this:
> >
> > dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
> > dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
> > dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
> > measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
> > measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
> > measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE
> >
> > The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a
> > kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to
> > measure or not
> >
> > Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be
> > used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why
> > those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than
> > ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately
> > bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the
> > full list of conditional comparisons.
>
> This makes a lot of sense.
>
> <snip>
>
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index c1583d98c5e5..82acd66bf653 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -731,13 +731,15 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> > * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
> > * @func: IMA hook
> > * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
> > + * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
> > * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed
> > *
> > * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
> > */
> > void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
> > const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
> > - int pcr, const char *keyring)
> > + int pcr, struct inode *inode,
> > + const char *keyring)
> > {
>
> The file descriptor is passed as the first arg to
> process_measurement(). Sorry for the patch churn, but could we do the
> same for process_buffer_measurements. As much as possible lets keep
> them in same.
Yep! That makes sense to me.
Tyler
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
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