[PATCH v2 1/3] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE

[Eric W. Biederman]

Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot at twosigma.com> writes:

>>>  proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
>>>  			struct inode *inode,
>>>  		        struct delayed_call *done)
>>>  {
>>> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>>> +	if (!(capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)))
>>>  		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
>
>> First of all -- sorry for late reply. You know, looking into this
>> code more I think this CAP_SYS_ADMIN is simply wrong: for example I
>> can't even fetch links for /proc/self/map_files. Still
>> /proc/$pid/maps (which as well points to the files opened) test for
>> ptrace-read permission. I think we need ptrace-may-attach test here
>> instead of these capabilities (if I can attach to a process I can
>> read any data needed, including the content of the mapped files, if
>> only I'm not missing something obvious).
>
> Currently /proc/pid/map_files/* have exactly the same permission
> checks as /proc/pid/fd/*, with the exception of the extra
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN check. The check originated from the following
> discussions where 3 security issues are discussed:
> http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1505.2/02524.html
> http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1505.2/04030.html
>
> From what I understand, the extra CAP_SYS_ADMIN comes from the
> following issues:

> 1. Being able to open dma-buf / kdbus region (referred in the
> referenced email as problem #1). I don't fully understand what the
> dangers are, but perhaps we could do CAP_SYS_ADMIN check only for such
> dangerous files, as opposed to all files.

I don't know precisely the concern but my memory is that some drivers do
interesting things when mmaped.  Possibly even to changing the vm_file.

I think that is worth running to the ground and figuring out in the
context of checkpoint/restart because the ordinary checkpoint/restart
code won't be able deal with them either.

So I vote for figuring that case out and dealing with it.


> 2. /proc/pid/fd/* is already a security hole (Andy says "I hope to fix
> that some day"). He essentially says that it's not because fds are
> insecure that map_files should be too. He seems to claim that mapped
> files that are then closed seems to be a bigger concern than other
> opened files. However, in the present time (5 years after these email
> conversations), the fd directory does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check
> which doesn't convinces me that the holes of /proc/pid/fd/* are such a
> big of a deal. I'm not entirely sure what security issue Andy refers
> to, but, I understand something along the lines of: Some process gets
> an fd of a file read-only opened (via a unix socket for example, or
> after a chroot), and gets to re-open the file in write access via
> /proc/self/fd/N to do some damage.

I would hope the other permission checks on such a file will prevent
some of that nonsense.  But definitely worth taking a hard look at.

> 3. Being able to ftruncate a file after a chroot+privilege drop. I may
> be wrong, but if privileges were dropped, then there's no reason that
> the then unprivileged user would have write access to the mmaped file
> inode. Seems a false problem.

Yes.

> It turns out that some of these concerns have been addressed with the
> introduction of memfd with seals, introduced around the same time
> where the map_files discussions took place. These seals allow one to
> share write access of an mmap region to an unsecure program, without
> fearing of getting a SIGBUS because the unsecure program could call
> ftruncate() on the fd. More on that at
> https://lwn.net/Articles/593918/ . Also, that article says "There are
> a number of fairly immediate use cases for the sealing functionality
> in general. Graphics drivers could use it to safely receive buffers
> from applications. The upcoming kdbus transport can benefit from
> sealing.". This rings a bell with problem #1. Perhaps memfd is a
> solution to Andy's concerns?

> Overall, I think the CAP_SYS_ADMIN map_files/ extra check compared to
> fd/ does not improve security in practice. Fds will be given to
> insecure programs. Better security can be achieved with memfd seals,
> and sane permissioning on files, regardless if they were once closed.

I would love to see the work put in to safely relax the permission check
from capable to ns_capable.  Which is just dealing with point 1.

There might be some other assumptions that a process can't get at mmaped
regions.

Eric