new seccomp mode aims to improve performance
Kees Cook
keescook at chromium.org
Tue Jun 2 18:37:03 UTC 2020
On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 02:44:31PM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Mo, 01.06.20 11:21, Kees Cook (keescook at chromium.org) wrote:
> > Would it make sense to provide a systemd setting for services to declare
> > "no compat" or "no x32" (I'm not sure what to call this mode more
> > generically, "no 32-bit allocation ABI"?) Then you can just install
> > a single merged filter for all the native syscalls that starts with
> > "if not native, reject"?
>
> We have that actually, it's this line you pasted above:
>
> SystemCallArchitectures=native
>
> It means: block all syscall ABIs but the native one for all processes
> of this service.
>
> We currently use that setting only to synthesize an explicit seccomp
> filter masking the other ABIs wholesale. We do not use it to suppress
> generation of other, unrelated seccomp filters for that
> arch. i.e. which means you might end up with one filter blocking x32
> wholesale, but then another unrelated option might install a filter
> blocking some specific syscall with some specific arguments, but still
> gets installed for x86-64 *and* i386 *and* x32. I guess we could
> relatively easily tweak that and suppress the latter. If we did, then
> on all services that set SystemCallArchitectures=native on x86-64 the
> number of installed seccomp filters should become a third.
Right, that's what I meant -- on x86_64 we've got way too many filters
installed if we only care about "native" arch. ;)
> > (Or better yet: make the default for filtering be "native only", and
> > let services opt into other ABIs?)
>
> That sounds like it would make people quite unhappy no? given that on
> a systemd system anything that runs in userspace is ultimately part of
> a service managed by systemd, if we'd default to "no native ABIs" this
> would translate to "yeah, we entirely disable the i386 ABI for the
> entire system unless you reconfigure it and/or opt-out your old i386
> services".
>
> Hence, on x86-64, I figure just masking i386 entirely is a bit too
> drastic a compat breakage for us, no? Masking x32 otoh sounds like a
> safe default to do without breaking too much compat given that x32 is
> on its way out.
Well, I meant "if seccomp filters get generated, default to native ABI".
Right now, it seems most things running from systemd with seccomp
filters are daemons, not user processes? (e.g. ssh.server,
getty at .service, etc have no filtering attached.)
--
Kees Cook
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