new seccomp mode aims to improve performance

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Sun, May 31, 2020 at 7:08 PM zhujianwei (C) <zhujianwei7 at huawei.com> wrote:
>
> This is the test result on linux 5.7.0-rc7 for aarch64.
> And retpoline disabled default.
> #cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
> Not affected
>
> bpf_jit_enable 1
> bpf_jit_harden 0
>
> We run unixbench syscall benchmark on the original kernel and the new one(replace bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu() with immediately returning 'allow' one).
> The unixbench syscall testcase runs 5 system calls（close/umask/dup/getpid/getuid, extra 15 syscalls needed to run it） in a loop for 10 seconds, counts the number and finally output it. We also add some more filters (each with the same rules) to evaluate the situation just like kees mentioned(case like systemd-resolve), and we find it is right: more filters, more overhead. The following is our result (./syscall 10 m):
>
> original:
>         seccomp_off:                    10684939
>         seccomp_on_1_filters:   8513805         overhead：19.8%
>         seccomp_on_4_filters:   7105592         overhead：33.0%
>         seccomp_on_32_filters:  2308677         overhead：78.3%
>
> after replacing bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu:
>         seccomp_off:                    10685244
>         seccomp_on_1_filters:   9146483         overhead：14.1%
>         seccomp_on_4_filters:   8969886         overhead：16.0%
>         seccomp_on_32_filters:  6454372         overhead：39.6%
>
> N-filter bpf overhead:
>         1_filters:              5.7%
>         4_filters:              17.0%
>         32_filters:     38.7%
>
> // kernel code modification place
> static noinline u32 bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu_allow(const struct bpf_prog *prog, const void *ctx)
> {
>         return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
> }

This is apples to oranges.
As explained earlier:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200531171915.wsxvdjeetmhpsdv2@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com/T/#u
Please use __weak instead of static and redo the numbers.