[PATCH v2 2/2] LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling

Micah Morton mortonm at chromium.org
Mon Jul 27 15:20:36 UTC 2020


From: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno at google.com>

The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid() calls based
on its configured security policies. This patch adds the analogous
functionality for setgid() calls. This is mostly a copy-and-paste change
with some code deduplication, plus slight modifications/name changes to
the policy-rule-related structs (now contain GID rules in addition to
the UID ones) and some type generalization since SafeSetID now needs to
deal with kgid_t and kuid_t types.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno at google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm at chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>
---
NOTE: this v2 patch features very minor tweaks to combine two if/else
statements into one and eliminate a redundant sanity check.
 security/safesetid/lsm.c        | 178 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 security/safesetid/lsm.h        |  38 +++++--
 security/safesetid/securityfs.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 300 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 7760019ad35d..787a98e82f1e 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -24,20 +24,36 @@
 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
 int safesetid_initialized;
 
-struct setuid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
+struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
+struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
+
 
 /* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
-enum sid_policy_type _setuid_policy_lookup(struct setuid_ruleset *policy,
-		kuid_t src, kuid_t dst)
+enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
+		kid_t src, kid_t dst)
 {
-	struct setuid_rule *rule;
+	struct setid_rule *rule;
 	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
 
-	hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src)) {
-		if (!uid_eq(rule->src_uid, src))
-			continue;
-		if (uid_eq(rule->dst_uid, dst))
-			return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
+	if (policy->type == UID) {
+		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src.uid)) {
+			if (!uid_eq(rule->src_id.uid, src.uid))
+				continue;
+			if (uid_eq(rule->dst_id.uid, dst.uid))
+				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
+			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		}
+	} else if (policy->type == GID) {
+		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kgid_val(src.gid)) {
+			if (!gid_eq(rule->src_id.gid, src.gid))
+				continue;
+			if (gid_eq(rule->dst_id.gid, dst.gid)){
+				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
+			}
+			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Should not reach here, report the ID as contrainsted */
 		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
 	}
 	return result;
@@ -47,15 +63,26 @@ enum sid_policy_type _setuid_policy_lookup(struct setuid_ruleset *policy,
  * Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
  * policy.
  */
-static enum sid_policy_type setuid_policy_lookup(kuid_t src, kuid_t dst)
+static enum sid_policy_type setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src, kid_t dst, enum setid_type new_type)
 {
 	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
-	struct setuid_ruleset *pol;
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
-	if (pol)
-		result = _setuid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
+	if (new_type == UID)
+		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
+	else if (new_type == GID)
+		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setgid_rules);
+	else { /* Should not reach here */
+		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return result;
+	}
+
+	if (pol) {
+		pol->type = new_type;
+		result = _setid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
+	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return result;
 }
@@ -65,8 +92,8 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
 				      int cap,
 				      unsigned int opts)
 {
-	/* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID. */
-	if (cap != CAP_SETUID)
+	/* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. */
+	if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -77,45 +104,83 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
 	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
-	 * other purposes.
-	 */
-	if (setuid_policy_lookup(cred->uid, INVALID_UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+	switch (cap) {
+	case CAP_SETUID:
+		/*
+		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
+		* other purposes.
+		*/
+		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)cred->uid, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
+		 * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
+		 */
+		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
+			__kuid_val(cred->uid));
+		return -EPERM;
+		break;
+	case CAP_SETGID:
+		/*
+		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETGID for
+		* other purposes.
+		*/
+		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)cred->gid, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
+		 * set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
+		 */
+		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not available to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
+			__kuid_val(cred->uid));
+		return -EPERM;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CAP_SETUID/GID */
 		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
-	 * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
-	 */
-	pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
-		__kuid_val(cred->uid));
-	return -EPERM;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
- * credentials that contain @new_uid.
+ * credentials that contain @new_id.
  */
-static bool uid_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kuid_t new_uid)
+static bool id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kid_t new_id, enum setid_type new_type)
 {
 	bool permitted;
 
-	/* If our old creds already had this UID in it, it's fine. */
-	if (uid_eq(new_uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_uid, old->euid) ||
-	    uid_eq(new_uid, old->suid))
-		return true;
+	/* If our old creds already had this ID in it, it's fine. */
+	if (new_type == UID) {
+		if (uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->euid) ||
+			uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->suid))
+			return true;
+	} else if (new_type == GID){
+		if (gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->gid) || gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->egid) ||
+			gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->sgid))
+			return true;
+	} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
+		return false;
 
 	/*
 	 * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
 	 * RUID.
 	 */
 	permitted =
-	    setuid_policy_lookup(old->uid, new_uid) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+	    setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)old->uid, new_id, new_type) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+
 	if (!permitted) {
-		pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
-			__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
-			__kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_uid));
+		if (new_type == UID) {
+			pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
+				__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
+				__kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_id.uid));
+		} else if (new_type == GID) {
+			pr_warn("GID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
+				__kgid_val(old->gid), __kgid_val(old->egid),
+				__kgid_val(old->sgid), __kgid_val(new_id.gid));
+		} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
+			return false;
 	}
 	return permitted;
 }
@@ -131,13 +196,37 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
 {
 
 	/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
-	if (setuid_policy_lookup(old->uid, INVALID_UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)old->uid, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->uid, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->euid, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->suid, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->fsuid, UID))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+	 * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
+	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+	 */
+	force_sig(SIGKILL);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
+				     const struct cred *old,
+				     int flags)
+{
+
+	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
+	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)old->gid, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->uid) &&
-	    uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->euid) &&
-	    uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->suid) &&
-	    uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->fsuid))
+	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->gid, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->egid, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->sgid, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->fsgid, GID))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -151,6 +240,7 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
 
 static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
 };
 
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.h b/security/safesetid/lsm.h
index db6d16e6bbc3..bde8c43a3767 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.h
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.h
@@ -27,27 +27,47 @@ enum sid_policy_type {
 	SIDPOL_ALLOWED /* target ID explicitly allowed */
 };
 
+typedef union {
+	kuid_t uid;
+	kgid_t gid;
+} kid_t;
+
+enum setid_type {
+	UID,
+	GID
+};
+
 /*
- * Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'src_uid'
- * can setuid to 'dst_uid'.
+ * Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'src_id'
+ * can set*id to 'dst_id'.
  */
-struct setuid_rule {
+struct setid_rule {
 	struct hlist_node next;
-	kuid_t src_uid;
-	kuid_t dst_uid;
+	kid_t src_id;
+	kid_t dst_id;
+
+	/* Flag to signal if rule is for UID's or GID's */
+	enum setid_type type;
 };
 
 #define SETID_HASH_BITS 8 /* 256 buckets in hash table */
 
-struct setuid_ruleset {
+/* Extension of INVALID_UID/INVALID_GID for kid_t type */
+#define INVALID_ID (kid_t){.uid = INVALID_UID}
+
+struct setid_ruleset {
 	DECLARE_HASHTABLE(rules, SETID_HASH_BITS);
 	char *policy_str;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
+
+	//Flag to signal if ruleset is for UID's or GID's
+	enum setid_type type;
 };
 
-enum sid_policy_type _setuid_policy_lookup(struct setuid_ruleset *policy,
-		kuid_t src, kuid_t dst);
+enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
+		kid_t src, kid_t dst);
 
-extern struct setuid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
+extern struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
+extern struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
 
 #endif /* _SAFESETID_H */
diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
index f8bc574cea9c..d8e6f2cc42c5 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
@@ -19,22 +19,23 @@
 
 #include "lsm.h"
 
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(policy_update_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(uid_policy_update_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(gid_policy_update_lock);
 
 /*
- * In the case the input buffer contains one or more invalid UIDs, the kuid_t
+ * In the case the input buffer contains one or more invalid IDs, the kid_t
  * variables pointed to by @parent and @child will get updated but this
  * function will return an error.
  * Contents of @buf may be modified.
  */
 static int parse_policy_line(struct file *file, char *buf,
-	struct setuid_rule *rule)
+	struct setid_rule *rule)
 {
 	char *child_str;
 	int ret;
 	u32 parsed_parent, parsed_child;
 
-	/* Format of |buf| string should be <UID>:<UID>. */
+	/* Format of |buf| string should be <UID>:<UID> or <GID>:<GID> */
 	child_str = strchr(buf, ':');
 	if (child_str == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -49,20 +50,29 @@ static int parse_policy_line(struct file *file, char *buf,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	rule->src_uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
-	rule->dst_uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
-	if (!uid_valid(rule->src_uid) || !uid_valid(rule->dst_uid))
+	if (rule->type == UID){
+		rule->src_id.uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
+		rule->dst_id.uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
+		if (!uid_valid(rule->src_id.uid) || !uid_valid(rule->dst_id.uid))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (rule->type == GID){
+		rule->src_id.gid = make_kgid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
+		rule->dst_id.gid = make_kgid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
+		if (!gid_valid(rule->src_id.gid) || !gid_valid(rule->dst_id.gid))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		/* Error, rule->type is an invalid type */
 		return -EINVAL;
-
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static void __release_ruleset(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 {
-	struct setuid_ruleset *pol =
-		container_of(rcu, struct setuid_ruleset, rcu);
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol =
+		container_of(rcu, struct setid_ruleset, rcu);
 	int bucket;
-	struct setuid_rule *rule;
+	struct setid_rule *rule;
 	struct hlist_node *tmp;
 
 	hash_for_each_safe(pol->rules, bucket, tmp, rule, next)
@@ -71,36 +81,55 @@ static void __release_ruleset(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 	kfree(pol);
 }
 
-static void release_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol)
-{
+static void release_ruleset(struct setid_ruleset *pol){
 	call_rcu(&pol->rcu, __release_ruleset);
 }
 
-static void insert_rule(struct setuid_ruleset *pol, struct setuid_rule *rule)
+static void insert_rule(struct setid_ruleset *pol, struct setid_rule *rule)
 {
-	hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kuid_val(rule->src_uid));
+	if (pol->type == UID)
+		hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kuid_val(rule->src_id.uid));
+	else if (pol->type == GID)
+		hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kgid_val(rule->src_id.gid));
+	else /* Error, pol->type is neither UID or GID */
+		return;
 }
 
-static int verify_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol)
+static int verify_ruleset(struct setid_ruleset *pol)
 {
 	int bucket;
-	struct setuid_rule *rule, *nrule;
+	struct setid_rule *rule, *nrule;
 	int res = 0;
 
 	hash_for_each(pol->rules, bucket, rule, next) {
-		if (_setuid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->dst_uid, INVALID_UID) ==
-		    SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
-			pr_warn("insecure policy detected: uid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through uid %d\n",
-				__kuid_val(rule->src_uid),
-				__kuid_val(rule->dst_uid));
+		if (_setid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->dst_id, INVALID_ID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
+			if (pol->type == UID) {
+				pr_warn("insecure policy detected: uid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through uid %d\n",
+					__kuid_val(rule->src_id.uid),
+					__kuid_val(rule->dst_id.uid));
+			} else if (pol->type == GID) {
+				pr_warn("insecure policy detected: gid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through gid %d\n",
+					__kgid_val(rule->src_id.gid),
+					__kgid_val(rule->dst_id.gid));
+			} else { /* pol->type is an invalid type */
+				res = -EINVAL;
+				return res;
+			}
 			res = -EINVAL;
 
 			/* fix it up */
-			nrule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setuid_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+			nrule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setid_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!nrule)
 				return -ENOMEM;
-			nrule->src_uid = rule->dst_uid;
-			nrule->dst_uid = rule->dst_uid;
+			if (pol->type == UID){
+				nrule->src_id.uid = rule->dst_id.uid;
+				nrule->dst_id.uid = rule->dst_id.uid;
+				nrule->type = UID;
+			} else { /* pol->type must be GID if we've made it to here */
+				nrule->src_id.gid = rule->dst_id.gid;
+				nrule->dst_id.gid = rule->dst_id.gid;
+				nrule->type = GID;
+			}
 			insert_rule(pol, nrule);
 		}
 	}
@@ -108,16 +137,17 @@ static int verify_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol)
 }
 
 static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
-				    const char __user *ubuf, size_t len)
+				    const char __user *ubuf, size_t len, enum setid_type policy_type)
 {
-	struct setuid_ruleset *pol;
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol;
 	char *buf, *p, *end;
 	int err;
 
-	pol = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setuid_ruleset), GFP_KERNEL);
+	pol = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setid_ruleset), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!pol)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	pol->policy_str = NULL;
+	pol->type = policy_type;
 	hash_init(pol->rules);
 
 	p = buf = memdup_user_nul(ubuf, len);
@@ -133,7 +163,7 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
 
 	/* policy lines, including the last one, end with \n */
 	while (*p != '\0') {
-		struct setuid_rule *rule;
+		struct setid_rule *rule;
 
 		end = strchr(p, '\n');
 		if (end == NULL) {
@@ -142,18 +172,18 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
 		}
 		*end = '\0';
 
-		rule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setuid_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+		rule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setid_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!rule) {
 			err = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out_free_buf;
 		}
 
+		rule->type = policy_type;
 		err = parse_policy_line(file, p, rule);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_free_rule;
 
-		if (_setuid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->src_uid, rule->dst_uid) ==
-		    SIDPOL_ALLOWED) {
+		if (_setid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->src_id, rule->dst_id) == SIDPOL_ALLOWED) {
 			pr_warn("bad policy: duplicate entry\n");
 			err = -EEXIST;
 			goto out_free_rule;
@@ -178,21 +208,31 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
 	 * What we really want here is an xchg() wrapper for RCU, but since that
 	 * doesn't currently exist, just use a spinlock for now.
 	 */
-	mutex_lock(&policy_update_lock);
-	pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setuid_rules, pol,
-				  lockdep_is_held(&policy_update_lock));
-	mutex_unlock(&policy_update_lock);
+	if (policy_type == UID) {
+		mutex_lock(&uid_policy_update_lock);
+		pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setuid_rules, pol,
+					  lockdep_is_held(&uid_policy_update_lock));
+		mutex_unlock(&uid_policy_update_lock);
+	} else if (policy_type == GID) {
+		mutex_lock(&gid_policy_update_lock);
+		pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setgid_rules, pol,
+					  lockdep_is_held(&gid_policy_update_lock));
+		mutex_unlock(&gid_policy_update_lock);
+	} else {
+		/* Error, policy type is neither UID or GID */
+		pr_warn("error: bad policy type");
+	}
 	err = len;
 
 out_free_buf:
 	kfree(buf);
 out_free_pol:
 	if (pol)
-                release_ruleset(pol);
+		release_ruleset(pol);
 	return err;
 }
 
-static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file,
+static ssize_t safesetid_uid_file_write(struct file *file,
 				    const char __user *buf,
 				    size_t len,
 				    loff_t *ppos)
@@ -203,38 +243,74 @@ static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file,
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len);
+	return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len, UID);
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_gid_file_write(struct file *file,
+				    const char __user *buf,
+				    size_t len,
+				    loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len, GID);
 }
 
 static ssize_t safesetid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
-				   size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+				   size_t len, loff_t *ppos, struct mutex *policy_update_lock, struct setid_ruleset* ruleset)
 {
 	ssize_t res = 0;
-	struct setuid_ruleset *pol;
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol;
 	const char *kbuf;
 
-	mutex_lock(&policy_update_lock);
-	pol = rcu_dereference_protected(safesetid_setuid_rules,
-					lockdep_is_held(&policy_update_lock));
+	mutex_lock(policy_update_lock);
+	pol = rcu_dereference_protected(ruleset, lockdep_is_held(&policy_update_lock));
 	if (pol) {
 		kbuf = pol->policy_str;
 		res = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, ppos,
 					      kbuf, strlen(kbuf));
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&policy_update_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(policy_update_lock);
+
 	return res;
 }
 
-static const struct file_operations safesetid_file_fops = {
-	.read = safesetid_file_read,
-	.write = safesetid_file_write,
+static ssize_t safesetid_uid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return safesetid_file_read(file, buf, len, ppos,
+				   &uid_policy_update_lock, safesetid_setuid_rules);
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_gid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return safesetid_file_read(file, buf, len, ppos,
+				   &gid_policy_update_lock, safesetid_setgid_rules);
+}
+
+
+
+static const struct file_operations safesetid_uid_file_fops = {
+	.read = safesetid_uid_file_read,
+	.write = safesetid_uid_file_write,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations safesetid_gid_file_fops = {
+	.read = safesetid_gid_file_read,
+	.write = safesetid_gid_file_write,
 };
 
 static int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void)
 {
 	int ret;
 	struct dentry *policy_dir;
-	struct dentry *policy_file;
+	struct dentry *uid_policy_file;
+	struct dentry *gid_policy_file;
 
 	if (!safesetid_initialized)
 		return 0;
@@ -245,13 +321,21 @@ static int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void)
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-	policy_file = securityfs_create_file("whitelist_policy", 0600,
-			policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_file_fops);
-	if (IS_ERR(policy_file)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(policy_file);
+	uid_policy_file = securityfs_create_file("uid_whitelist_policy", 0600,
+			policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_uid_file_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(uid_policy_file)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(uid_policy_file);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
+	gid_policy_file = securityfs_create_file("gid_whitelist_policy", 0600,
+			policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_gid_file_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(gid_policy_file)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(gid_policy_file);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+
 	return 0;
 
 error:
-- 
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog



More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list