[PATCH 2/2] LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling
Thomas Cedeno
thomascedeno at google.com
Tue Jul 21 17:01:20 UTC 2020
On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 10:42 PM Serge E. Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 11:12:03AM -0700, Micah Morton wrote:
> > From: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno at google.com>
> >
> > The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid() calls based
> > on its configured security policies. This patch adds the analogous
> > functionality for setgid() calls. This is mostly a copy-and-paste change
> > with some code deduplication, plus slight modifications/name changes to
> > the policy-rule-related structs (now contain GID rules in addition to
> > the UID ones) and some type generalization since SafeSetID now needs to
> > deal with kgid_t and kuid_t types.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno at google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm at chromium.org>
>
> Just one question and two little comments below.
>
> > ---
> > NOTE: Looks like some userns-related lines in the selftest for SafeSetID
> > recently had some kind of regression. We won't be sending a patch to
> > update the selftest until we can get to the bottom of that. However, we
> > have a WIP (due to the userns regression) update to the selftest which
> > tests the GID stuff and we have used it to ensure this patch is correct.
> >
> > security/safesetid/lsm.c | 178 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
> > security/safesetid/lsm.h | 38 ++++--
> > security/safesetid/securityfs.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> > 3 files changed, 309 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > index 7760019ad35d..787a98e82f1e 100644
> > --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> > @@ -24,20 +24,36 @@
> > /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
> > int safesetid_initialized;
> >
> > -struct setuid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
> > +struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
> > +struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
> > +
> >
> > /* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
> > -enum sid_policy_type _setuid_policy_lookup(struct setuid_ruleset *policy,
> > - kuid_t src, kuid_t dst)
> > +enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
> > + kid_t src, kid_t dst)
> > {
> > - struct setuid_rule *rule;
> > + struct setid_rule *rule;
> > enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
> >
> > - hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src)) {
> > - if (!uid_eq(rule->src_uid, src))
> > - continue;
> > - if (uid_eq(rule->dst_uid, dst))
> > - return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
> > + if (policy->type == UID) {
> > + hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src.uid)) {
> > + if (!uid_eq(rule->src_id.uid, src.uid))
> > + continue;
> > + if (uid_eq(rule->dst_id.uid, dst.uid))
> > + return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
> > + result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
>
> Can you describe precisely under which conditions SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED should
> be returned vs. SIDPOL_DEFAULT?
>
For calculating ID transitions, SafeSetID takes in a src and dst UID
or GID and if an existing policy lists the source ID but not the dst
ID in one or more of its rules, we need to constrain the ID and thus
return SIDPOOL_CONSTRAINED. If no policy even mentions the src ID, it
passes through as SIDPOOL_DEFAULT, where the ID is not constrained and
can be used for other purposes.
> > + }
> > + } else if (policy->type == GID) {
> > + hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kgid_val(src.gid)) {
> > + if (!gid_eq(rule->src_id.gid, src.gid))
> > + continue;
> > + if (gid_eq(rule->dst_id.gid, dst.gid)){
> > + return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
> > + }
> > + result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
> > + }
> > + } else {
> > + /* Should not reach here, report the ID as contrainsted */
> > result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
> > }
> > return result;
> > @@ -47,15 +63,26 @@ enum sid_policy_type _setuid_policy_lookup(struct setuid_ruleset *policy,
> > * Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
> > * policy.
> > */
> > -static enum sid_policy_type setuid_policy_lookup(kuid_t src, kuid_t dst)
> > +static enum sid_policy_type setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src, kid_t dst, enum setid_type new_type)
> > {
> > enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
> > - struct setuid_ruleset *pol;
> > + struct setid_ruleset *pol;
> >
> > rcu_read_lock();
> > - pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
> > - if (pol)
> > - result = _setuid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
> > + if (new_type == UID)
> > + pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
> > + else if (new_type == GID)
> > + pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setgid_rules);
> > + else { /* Should not reach here */
> > + result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
> > + rcu_read_unlock();
> > + return result;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (pol) {
> > + pol->type = new_type;
> > + result = _setid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
> > + }
> > rcu_read_unlock();
> > return result;
> > }
> > @@ -65,8 +92,8 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> > int cap,
> > unsigned int opts)
> > {
> > - /* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID. */
> > - if (cap != CAP_SETUID)
> > + /* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. */
> > + if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID)
> > return 0;
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -77,45 +104,83 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> > if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
> > return 0;
> >
> > - /*
> > - * If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
> > - * other purposes.
> > - */
> > - if (setuid_policy_lookup(cred->uid, INVALID_UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
> > + switch (cap) {
> > + case CAP_SETUID:
> > + /*
> > + * If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
> > + * other purposes.
> > + */
> > + if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)cred->uid, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
> > + return 0;
> > + /*
> > + * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
> > + * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
> > + */
> > + pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
> > + __kuid_val(cred->uid));
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + break;
> > + case CAP_SETGID:
> > + /*
> > + * If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETGID for
> > + * other purposes.
> > + */
> > + if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)cred->gid, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
> > + return 0;
> > + /*
> > + * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
> > + * set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
> > + */
> > + pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not available to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
> > + __kuid_val(cred->uid));
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + /* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CAP_SETUID/GID */
> > return 0;
> > -
> > - /*
> > - * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
> > - * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
> > - */
> > - pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
> > - __kuid_val(cred->uid));
> > - return -EPERM;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + return 0;
> > }
> >
> > /*
> > * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
> > - * credentials that contain @new_uid.
> > + * credentials that contain @new_id.
> > */
> > -static bool uid_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kuid_t new_uid)
> > +static bool id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kid_t new_id, enum setid_type new_type)
> > {
> > bool permitted;
> >
> > - /* If our old creds already had this UID in it, it's fine. */
> > - if (uid_eq(new_uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_uid, old->euid) ||
> > - uid_eq(new_uid, old->suid))
> > - return true;
> > + /* If our old creds already had this ID in it, it's fine. */
> > + if (new_type == UID) {
> > + if (uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->euid) ||
> > + uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->suid))
> > + return true;
> > + } else if (new_type == GID){
> > + if (gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->gid) || gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->egid) ||
> > + gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->sgid))
> > + return true;
> > + } else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
> > + return false;
> >
> > /*
> > * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
> > * RUID.
> > */
> > permitted =
> > - setuid_policy_lookup(old->uid, new_uid) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
> > + setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)old->uid, new_id, new_type) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
> > +
> > if (!permitted) {
> > - pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
> > - __kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
> > - __kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_uid));
> > + if (new_type == UID) {
> > + pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
> > + __kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
> > + __kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_id.uid));
> > + } else if (new_type == GID) {
> > + pr_warn("GID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
> > + __kgid_val(old->gid), __kgid_val(old->egid),
> > + __kgid_val(old->sgid), __kgid_val(new_id.gid));
> > + } else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
> > + return false;
> > }
> > return permitted;
> > }
> > @@ -131,13 +196,37 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
> > {
> >
> > /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
> > - if (setuid_policy_lookup(old->uid, INVALID_UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
> > + if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)old->uid, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->uid, UID) &&
> > + id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->euid, UID) &&
> > + id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->suid, UID) &&
> > + id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->fsuid, UID))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
> > + * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
> > + * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
> > + */
> > + force_sig(SIGKILL);
> > + return -EACCES;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
> > + const struct cred *old,
> > + int flags)
> > +{
> > +
> > + /* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
> > + if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t)old->gid, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
> > return 0;
> >
> > - if (uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->uid) &&
> > - uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->euid) &&
> > - uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->suid) &&
> > - uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->fsuid))
> > + if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->gid, GID) &&
> > + id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->egid, GID) &&
> > + id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->sgid, GID) &&
> > + id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t)new->fsgid, GID))
> > return 0;
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -151,6 +240,7 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
> >
> > static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
> > };
> >
> > diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.h b/security/safesetid/lsm.h
> > index db6d16e6bbc3..bde8c43a3767 100644
> > --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.h
> > +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.h
> > @@ -27,27 +27,47 @@ enum sid_policy_type {
> > SIDPOL_ALLOWED /* target ID explicitly allowed */
> > };
> >
> > +typedef union {
> > + kuid_t uid;
> > + kgid_t gid;
> > +} kid_t;
> > +
> > +enum setid_type {
> > + UID,
> > + GID
> > +};
> > +
> > /*
> > - * Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'src_uid'
> > - * can setuid to 'dst_uid'.
> > + * Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'src_id'
> > + * can set*id to 'dst_id'.
> > */
> > -struct setuid_rule {
> > +struct setid_rule {
> > struct hlist_node next;
> > - kuid_t src_uid;
> > - kuid_t dst_uid;
> > + kid_t src_id;
> > + kid_t dst_id;
> > +
> > + /* Flag to signal if rule is for UID's or GID's */
> > + enum setid_type type;
> > };
> >
> > #define SETID_HASH_BITS 8 /* 256 buckets in hash table */
> >
> > -struct setuid_ruleset {
> > +/* Extension of INVALID_UID/INVALID_GID for kid_t type */
> > +#define INVALID_ID (kid_t){.uid = INVALID_UID}
> > +
> > +struct setid_ruleset {
> > DECLARE_HASHTABLE(rules, SETID_HASH_BITS);
> > char *policy_str;
> > struct rcu_head rcu;
> > +
> > + //Flag to signal if ruleset is for UID's or GID's
> > + enum setid_type type;
> > };
> >
> > -enum sid_policy_type _setuid_policy_lookup(struct setuid_ruleset *policy,
> > - kuid_t src, kuid_t dst);
> > +enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
> > + kid_t src, kid_t dst);
> >
> > -extern struct setuid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
> > +extern struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
> > +extern struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
> >
> > #endif /* _SAFESETID_H */
> > diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
> > index f8bc574cea9c..211050d0a922 100644
> > --- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
> > +++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
> > @@ -19,22 +19,23 @@
> >
> > #include "lsm.h"
> >
> > -static DEFINE_MUTEX(policy_update_lock);
> > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(uid_policy_update_lock);
> > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(gid_policy_update_lock);
> >
> > /*
> > - * In the case the input buffer contains one or more invalid UIDs, the kuid_t
> > + * In the case the input buffer contains one or more invalid IDs, the kid_t
> > * variables pointed to by @parent and @child will get updated but this
> > * function will return an error.
> > * Contents of @buf may be modified.
> > */
> > static int parse_policy_line(struct file *file, char *buf,
> > - struct setuid_rule *rule)
> > + struct setid_rule *rule)
> > {
> > char *child_str;
> > int ret;
> > u32 parsed_parent, parsed_child;
> >
> > - /* Format of |buf| string should be <UID>:<UID>. */
> > + /* Format of |buf| string should be <UID>:<UID> or <GID>:<GID> */
> > child_str = strchr(buf, ':');
> > if (child_str == NULL)
> > return -EINVAL;
> > @@ -49,20 +50,36 @@ static int parse_policy_line(struct file *file, char *buf,
> > if (ret)
> > return ret;
> >
> > - rule->src_uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
> > - rule->dst_uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
> > - if (!uid_valid(rule->src_uid) || !uid_valid(rule->dst_uid))
> > + if (rule->type == UID){
> > + rule->src_id.uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
> > + rule->dst_id.uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
> > + } else if (rule->type == GID){
> > + rule->src_id.gid = make_kgid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
> > + rule->dst_id.gid = make_kgid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
> > + } else {
> > + /* Error, rule->type is an invalid type */
> > return -EINVAL;
> > + }
>
> Is there any reason to have these the below if/else actions go into the above
> if/else block?
>
As for the two if/elseif/else branches in the parse_policy_line
function, I think you're right in the fact that they can be collapsed
together. We'll introduce another patch to modify this.
> > + if (rule->type == UID) {
> > + if (!uid_valid(rule->src_id.uid) || !uid_valid(rule->dst_id.uid))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + } else if (rule->type == GID) {
> > + if (!gid_valid(rule->src_id.gid) || !gid_valid(rule->dst_id.gid))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + } else {
> > + /* Error, rule->type is an invalid type */
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > static void __release_ruleset(struct rcu_head *rcu)
> > {
> > - struct setuid_ruleset *pol =
> > - container_of(rcu, struct setuid_ruleset, rcu);
> > + struct setid_ruleset *pol =
> > + container_of(rcu, struct setid_ruleset, rcu);
> > int bucket;
> > - struct setuid_rule *rule;
> > + struct setid_rule *rule;
> > struct hlist_node *tmp;
> >
> > hash_for_each_safe(pol->rules, bucket, tmp, rule, next)
> > @@ -71,36 +88,58 @@ static void __release_ruleset(struct rcu_head *rcu)
> > kfree(pol);
> > }
> >
> > -static void release_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol)
> > -{
> > +static void release_ruleset(struct setid_ruleset *pol){
> > call_rcu(&pol->rcu, __release_ruleset);
> > }
> >
> > -static void insert_rule(struct setuid_ruleset *pol, struct setuid_rule *rule)
> > +static void insert_rule(struct setid_ruleset *pol, struct setid_rule *rule)
> > {
> > - hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kuid_val(rule->src_uid));
> > + if (pol->type == UID)
> > + hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kuid_val(rule->src_id.uid));
> > + else if (pol->type == GID)
> > + hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kgid_val(rule->src_id.gid));
> > + else /* Error, pol->type is neither UID or GID */
> > + return;
> > }
> >
> > -static int verify_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol)
> > +static int verify_ruleset(struct setid_ruleset *pol)
> > {
> > int bucket;
> > - struct setuid_rule *rule, *nrule;
> > + struct setid_rule *rule, *nrule;
> > int res = 0;
> >
> > hash_for_each(pol->rules, bucket, rule, next) {
> > - if (_setuid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->dst_uid, INVALID_UID) ==
> > - SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
> > - pr_warn("insecure policy detected: uid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through uid %d\n",
> > - __kuid_val(rule->src_uid),
> > - __kuid_val(rule->dst_uid));
> > + if (_setid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->dst_id, INVALID_ID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
> > + if (pol->type == UID) {
> > + pr_warn("insecure policy detected: uid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through uid %d\n",
> > + __kuid_val(rule->src_id.uid),
> > + __kuid_val(rule->dst_id.uid));
> > + } else if (pol->type == GID) {
> > + pr_warn("insecure policy detected: gid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through gid %d\n",
> > + __kgid_val(rule->src_id.gid),
> > + __kgid_val(rule->dst_id.gid));
> > + } else { /* pol->type is an invalid type */
> > + res = -EINVAL;
> > + return res;
> > + }
> > res = -EINVAL;
> >
> > /* fix it up */
> > - nrule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setuid_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
> > + nrule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setid_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
> > if (!nrule)
> > return -ENOMEM;
> > - nrule->src_uid = rule->dst_uid;
> > - nrule->dst_uid = rule->dst_uid;
> > + if (pol->type == UID){
> > + nrule->src_id.uid = rule->dst_id.uid;
> > + nrule->dst_id.uid = rule->dst_id.uid;
> > + nrule->type = UID;
> > + } else if (pol->type == GID){
> > + nrule->src_id.gid = rule->dst_id.gid;
> > + nrule->dst_id.gid = rule->dst_id.gid;
> > + nrule->type = GID;
> > + } else { /* Error, pol->type is neither UID or GID */
> > + kfree(nrule);
>
> Why not check this before the kmalloc?
>
The whole else branch is a sanity check and probably will never be
used, but looking at it a second time, it is being redundantly checked
with the else statement in the above branch, so this else statement
can be gone with the new patch.
> > + return res;
> > + }
> > insert_rule(pol, nrule);
> > }
> > }
> > @@ -108,16 +147,17 @@ static int verify_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol)
> > }
> >
> > static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
> > - const char __user *ubuf, size_t len)
> > + const char __user *ubuf, size_t len, enum setid_type policy_type)
> > {
> > - struct setuid_ruleset *pol;
> > + struct setid_ruleset *pol;
> > char *buf, *p, *end;
> > int err;
> >
> > - pol = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setuid_ruleset), GFP_KERNEL);
> > + pol = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setid_ruleset), GFP_KERNEL);
> > if (!pol)
> > return -ENOMEM;
> > pol->policy_str = NULL;
> > + pol->type = policy_type;
> > hash_init(pol->rules);
> >
> > p = buf = memdup_user_nul(ubuf, len);
> > @@ -133,7 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
> >
> > /* policy lines, including the last one, end with \n */
> > while (*p != '\0') {
> > - struct setuid_rule *rule;
> > + struct setid_rule *rule;
> >
> > end = strchr(p, '\n');
> > if (end == NULL) {
> > @@ -142,18 +182,18 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
> > }
> > *end = '\0';
> >
> > - rule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setuid_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
> > + rule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setid_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
> > if (!rule) {
> > err = -ENOMEM;
> > goto out_free_buf;
> > }
> >
> > + rule->type = policy_type;
> > err = parse_policy_line(file, p, rule);
> > if (err)
> > goto out_free_rule;
> >
> > - if (_setuid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->src_uid, rule->dst_uid) ==
> > - SIDPOL_ALLOWED) {
> > + if (_setid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->src_id, rule->dst_id) == SIDPOL_ALLOWED) {
> > pr_warn("bad policy: duplicate entry\n");
> > err = -EEXIST;
> > goto out_free_rule;
> > @@ -178,21 +218,45 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
> > * What we really want here is an xchg() wrapper for RCU, but since that
> > * doesn't currently exist, just use a spinlock for now.
> > */
> > - mutex_lock(&policy_update_lock);
> > - pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setuid_rules, pol,
> > - lockdep_is_held(&policy_update_lock));
> > - mutex_unlock(&policy_update_lock);
> > + if (policy_type == UID) {
> > + mutex_lock(&uid_policy_update_lock);
> > + pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setuid_rules, pol,
> > + lockdep_is_held(&uid_policy_update_lock));
> > + mutex_unlock(&uid_policy_update_lock);
> > + } else if (policy_type == GID) {
> > + mutex_lock(&gid_policy_update_lock);
> > + pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setgid_rules, pol,
> > + lockdep_is_held(&gid_policy_update_lock));
> > + mutex_unlock(&gid_policy_update_lock);
> > + } else {
> > + /* Error, policy type is neither UID or GID */
> > + pr_warn("error: bad policy type");
> > + }
> > err = len;
> >
> > out_free_buf:
> > kfree(buf);
> > out_free_pol:
> > if (pol)
> > - release_ruleset(pol);
> > + release_ruleset(pol);
> > return err;
> > }
> >
> > -static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file,
> > +static ssize_t safesetid_uid_file_write(struct file *file,
> > + const char __user *buf,
> > + size_t len,
> > + loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > + if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > +
> > + if (*ppos != 0)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len, UID);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static ssize_t safesetid_gid_file_write(struct file *file,
> > const char __user *buf,
> > size_t len,
> > loff_t *ppos)
> > @@ -203,38 +267,60 @@ static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file,
> > if (*ppos != 0)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > - return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len);
> > + return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len, GID);
> > }
> >
> > static ssize_t safesetid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
> > - size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
> > + size_t len, loff_t *ppos, struct mutex *policy_update_lock, struct setid_ruleset* ruleset)
> > {
> > ssize_t res = 0;
> > - struct setuid_ruleset *pol;
> > + struct setid_ruleset *pol;
> > const char *kbuf;
> >
> > - mutex_lock(&policy_update_lock);
> > - pol = rcu_dereference_protected(safesetid_setuid_rules,
> > - lockdep_is_held(&policy_update_lock));
> > + mutex_lock(policy_update_lock);
> > + pol = rcu_dereference_protected(ruleset, lockdep_is_held(&policy_update_lock));
> > if (pol) {
> > kbuf = pol->policy_str;
> > res = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, ppos,
> > kbuf, strlen(kbuf));
> > }
> > - mutex_unlock(&policy_update_lock);
> > + mutex_unlock(policy_update_lock);
> > +
> > return res;
> > }
> >
> > -static const struct file_operations safesetid_file_fops = {
> > - .read = safesetid_file_read,
> > - .write = safesetid_file_write,
> > +static ssize_t safesetid_uid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
> > + size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > + return safesetid_file_read(file, buf, len, ppos,
> > + &uid_policy_update_lock, safesetid_setuid_rules);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static ssize_t safesetid_gid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
> > + size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > + return safesetid_file_read(file, buf, len, ppos,
> > + &gid_policy_update_lock, safesetid_setgid_rules);
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +
> > +static const struct file_operations safesetid_uid_file_fops = {
> > + .read = safesetid_uid_file_read,
> > + .write = safesetid_uid_file_write,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static const struct file_operations safesetid_gid_file_fops = {
> > + .read = safesetid_gid_file_read,
> > + .write = safesetid_gid_file_write,
> > };
> >
> > static int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void)
> > {
> > int ret;
> > struct dentry *policy_dir;
> > - struct dentry *policy_file;
> > + struct dentry *uid_policy_file;
> > + struct dentry *gid_policy_file;
> >
> > if (!safesetid_initialized)
> > return 0;
> > @@ -245,13 +331,21 @@ static int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void)
> > goto error;
> > }
> >
> > - policy_file = securityfs_create_file("whitelist_policy", 0600,
> > - policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_file_fops);
> > - if (IS_ERR(policy_file)) {
> > - ret = PTR_ERR(policy_file);
> > + uid_policy_file = securityfs_create_file("uid_whitelist_policy", 0600,
> > + policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_uid_file_fops);
> > + if (IS_ERR(uid_policy_file)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(uid_policy_file);
> > goto error;
> > }
> >
> > + gid_policy_file = securityfs_create_file("gid_whitelist_policy", 0600,
> > + policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_gid_file_fops);
> > + if (IS_ERR(gid_policy_file)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(gid_policy_file);
> > + goto error;
> > + }
> > +
> > +
> > return 0;
> >
> > error:
> > --
> > 2.28.0.rc0.105.gf9edc3c819-goog
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