[PATCH v2 04/10] ovl: make ioctl() safe
miklos at szeredi.hu
Mon Dec 14 13:23:51 UTC 2020
On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 6:44 AM Amir Goldstein <amir73il at gmail.com> wrote:
> Perhaps, but there is a much bigger issue with this change IMO.
> Not because of dropping rule (b) of the permission model, but because
> of relaxing rule (a).
> Should overlayfs respect the conservative interpretation as it partly did
> until this commit, a lower file must not lose IMMUTABLE/APPEND_ONLY
> after copy up, but that is exactly what is going to happen if we first
> copy up and then fail permission check on setting the flags.
Yeah, it's a mess. This will hopefully sort it out, as it will allow
easier copy up of flags:
In actual fact losing S_APPEND is not currently prevented by copy-up
triggered by anything other than FS_IOC_SETX*, and even that is prone
to races as indicated by the bug report that resulted in this patch.
Let's just fix the IMMUTABLE case:
- if the file is already copied up with data (since the overlay
ioctl implementation currently uses the realdata), then we're fine to
- if the file is not IMMUTABLE to start with, then also fine to copy
up; even if the op will fail after copy up we haven't done anything
that wouldn't be possible without this particular codepath
- if task has CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE (can add/remove immutable) then
it's also fine to copy up since we can be fairly sure that the actual
setflags will succeed as well. If not, that can be a problem, but as
I've said copying up IMMUTABLE and other flags should really be done
by the copy up code, otherwise it won't work properly.
Something like this incremental should be good, I think:
@@ -576,6 +576,15 @@ static long ovl_ioctl_set_flags(struct f
+ * Prevent copy up if immutable and has no CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
+ * capability.
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (!ovl_has_upperdata(inode) && IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) &&
+ goto unlock;
ret = ovl_maybe_copy_up(file_dentry(file), O_WRONLY);
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