[PATCH v2 03/10] ovl: check privs before decoding file handle
miklos at szeredi.hu
Wed Dec 9 10:13:17 UTC 2020
On Tue, Dec 8, 2020 at 2:53 PM Amir Goldstein <amir73il at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 6:36 PM Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi at redhat.com> wrote:
> > CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is required by open_by_handle_at(2) so check it in
> > ovl_decode_real_fh() as well to prevent privilege escalation for
> > unprivileged overlay mounts.
> > Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi at redhat.com>
> > ---
> > fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 3 +++
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> > index a6162c4076db..82a55fdb1e7a 100644
> > --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> > @@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fh *fh, struct vfsmount *mnt,
> > struct dentry *real;
> > int bytes;
> > + if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> If the mounter is not capable in init ns, ovl_check_origin() and
> will not function as expected and this will break index and nfs export features.
NFS export is clear-cut.
Hard link indexing should work without fh decoding, since it is only
encoding the file handle to search for the index entry, and encoding
is not privileged.
Not sure how ovl_verify_index will choke on that, will have to try...
but worse case we just need to disable verification.
And yeah, using .overlay.origin attribute for inode number consistency
won't work either, but it should fail silently (which is probably a
good thing). Haven't tested this yet, though.
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