[PATCH v36 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com
Wed Aug 26 13:46:06 UTC 2020
On Tue, Aug 25, 2020 at 06:44:12PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 04:52:50PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>
> Just minor things below - I'm not even going to pretend I fully
> understand what's going on but FWICT, it looks non-threateningly ok to
> me.
>
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..b52520407f5b
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
> > +// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
> > +
> > +#include <linux/acpi.h>
> > +#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
> > +#include <linux/mman.h>
> > +#include <linux/security.h>
> > +#include <linux/suspend.h>
> > +#include <asm/traps.h>
> > +#include "driver.h"
> > +#include "encl.h"
> > +
> > +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Intel SGX Enclave Driver");
> > +MODULE_AUTHOR("Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com>");
> > +MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
>
> That boilerplate stuff usually goes to the end of the file.
These all are cruft from the times when we still had a kernel module.
I.e. I'll just remove them.
>
> ...
>
> > +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> > + unsigned long addr)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
> > + unsigned int flags;
> > +
> > + /* If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set
> > + * to NULL.
> > + */
> > + if (!encl)
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> > +
> > + flags = atomic_read(&encl->flags);
> > +
>
> ^ Superfluous newline.
>
> > + if ((flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD) || !(flags & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED))
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> > +
> > + entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
> > + if (!entry)
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> > +
> > + /* Page is already resident in the EPC. */
> > + if (entry->epc_page)
> > + return entry;
> > +
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
> > + struct mm_struct *mm)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
> > + container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
>
> Just let it stick out.
>
> > + struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp = NULL;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * The enclave itself can remove encl_mm. Note, objects can't be moved
> > + * off an RCU protected list, but deletion is ok.
> > + */
> > + spin_lock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
> > + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &encl_mm->encl->mm_list, list) {
> > + if (tmp == encl_mm) {
> > + list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list);
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + }
> > + spin_unlock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
> > +
> > + if (tmp == encl_mm) {
> > + synchronize_srcu(&encl_mm->encl->srcu);
> > + mmu_notifier_put(mn);
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void sgx_mmu_notifier_free(struct mmu_notifier *mn)
> > +{
> > + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
> > + container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
>
> Ditto.
>
> ...
>
> > +/**
> > + * sgx_encl_may_map() - Check if a requested VMA mapping is allowed
> > + * @encl: an enclave
> > + * @start: lower bound of the address range, inclusive
> > + * @end: upper bound of the address range, exclusive
> > + * @vm_prot_bits: requested protections of the address range
> > + *
> > + * Iterate through the enclave pages contained within [@start, @end) to verify
> > + * the permissions requested by @vm_prot_bits do not exceed that of any enclave
> > + * page to be mapped.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * 0 on success,
> > + * -EACCES if VMA permissions exceed enclave page permissions
> > + */
> > +int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
> > + unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
> > + unsigned long idx_start = PFN_DOWN(start);
> > + unsigned long idx_end = PFN_DOWN(end - 1);
> > + struct sgx_encl_page *page;
> > + XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, idx_start);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Disallow RIE tasks as their VMA permissions might conflict with the
>
> "RIE", hmm what is that?
>
> /me looks at the test
>
> Aaah, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC. Is "RIE" some widely accepted acronym I'm not
> aware of?
I think it was used in some email discussions related to this piece of
code but I'm happy to write it as READ_IMPLIES_EXEC :-)
>
> > + * enclave page permissions.
> > + */
> > + if (!!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
>
> The "!!" is not really needed - you're in boolean context.
>
> ...
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
Thanks for the remarks.
/Jarkko
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