[RFC PATCH 06/30] ima: Add ima namespace to the ima subsystem APIs
krzysztof.struczynski at huawei.com
krzysztof.struczynski at huawei.com
Tue Aug 18 15:20:13 UTC 2020
From: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski at huawei.com>
Add ima namespace pointer to the input parameters of the relevant
functions. This is a preparation for the policy namespacing, more
functions may be modified later, when other aspects of the ima are
namespaced.
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski at huawei.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 4 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 25 ++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 16 +++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++---------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 36 +++++++++++--------
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +-
9 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index d61c9c21ffb9..3fd3746a0dee 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -140,13 +140,13 @@ static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
-extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
+extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
#else
-static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
+static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 4872f193f7a3..7d522fdab0d8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -264,7 +264,8 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *keyring);
+ const char *keyring,
+ const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -276,7 +277,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr, const char *keyring);
+ int pcr, const char *keyring,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
@@ -292,15 +294,16 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *keyring);
+ const char *keyring,
+ const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_init_ns_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns,
const struct ima_policy_setup_data *policy_setup_data);
void ima_update_policy(void);
-void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
+void ima_update_policy_flag(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
void ima_delete_rules(void);
-int ima_check_policy(void);
+int ima_check_policy(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
@@ -327,13 +330,15 @@ int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str,
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr);
+ const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
-int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
enum ima_hooks func);
@@ -344,7 +349,8 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
#else
static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
+ const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -361,7 +367,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
}
static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ enum ima_hooks func,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 4f39fb93f278..8b41183200e8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
* @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
* @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action
+ * @ima_ns: ima namespace whose policy data will be used
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -186,14 +187,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *keyring)
+ const char *keyring,
+ const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
- template_desc, keyring);
+ template_desc, keyring, ima_ns);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 0632d3881611..9388ff88ca4d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -48,10 +48,11 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
/*
* is_ima_appraise_enabled - return appraise status
+ * @ima_ns: pointer to the ima namespace being checked
*
* Only return enabled, if not in ima_appraise="fix" or "log" modes.
*/
-bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
+bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
}
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*
* Return 1 to appraise or hash
*/
-int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
+int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
u32 secid;
@@ -70,7 +72,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
- IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -328,7 +331,8 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
* Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted.
*/
int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
+ const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
const u8 *digest = NULL;
@@ -345,7 +349,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
- pcr, NULL);
+ pcr, NULL, NULL);
}
return rc;
@@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
|| !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return;
- action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
+ action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR, NULL);
if (!action)
__vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
index 1c68c500c26f..58aa56b0422d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -60,5 +60,6 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
*/
process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len,
keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
- keyring->description);
+ keyring->description,
+ NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e3fcad871861..97aadee7e68e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
return seq_release(inode, file);
- if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) {
+ if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy(NULL) < 0) {
cause = "failed";
valid_policy = 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c7e29277b953..196fa2bd490d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
int must_measure,
char **pathbuf,
const char **pathname,
- char *filename)
+ char *filename,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
@@ -215,7 +216,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ enum ima_hooks func,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
- &template_desc, NULL);
+ &template_desc, NULL, ima_ns);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -261,7 +263,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
if (!rc && violation_check)
ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
- &pathbuf, &pathname, filename);
+ &pathbuf, &pathname, filename, ima_ns);
inode_unlock(inode);
@@ -359,7 +361,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
template_desc);
if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
- rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr);
+ rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr, ima_ns);
if (rc != -EPERM) {
inode_lock(inode);
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file,
@@ -413,7 +415,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, NULL);
}
return 0;
@@ -452,7 +454,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
- MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0);
+ MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0, NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -491,13 +493,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, NULL);
}
/**
@@ -517,7 +519,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
- MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
+ MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
@@ -583,7 +585,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode)
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int must_appraise;
- must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
+ must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK, NULL);
if (!must_appraise)
return;
@@ -610,7 +612,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int must_appraise;
- must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
+ must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK, NULL);
if (!must_appraise)
return;
@@ -697,7 +699,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ MAY_READ, func, NULL);
}
/**
@@ -764,7 +766,8 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
*/
void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr, const char *keyring)
+ int pcr, const char *keyring,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
int ret = 0;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -796,7 +799,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
- &pcr, &template, keyring);
+ &pcr, &template, keyring, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
@@ -868,7 +871,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
return;
process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
- "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+ "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL,
+ NULL);
fdput(f);
}
@@ -897,7 +901,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
if (!error)
- ima_update_policy_flag();
+ ima_update_policy_flag(&init_ima_ns);
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 403854b18ef2..12f9dcf73c83 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -598,6 +598,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
* @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy.
* keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK.
+ * @ima_ns: IMA namespace whose policies are being checked
*
* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
* conditions.
@@ -609,7 +610,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *keyring)
+ const char *keyring,
+ const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -662,8 +664,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
* loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
* out of a function or not call the function in the first place
* can be made earlier.
+ * @ima_ns: pointer to the ima namespace whose policy flag is updated
*/
-void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
+void ima_update_policy_flag(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
@@ -690,7 +693,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
return 0;
}
-static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
+static void add_rules(struct ima_policy_data *policy_data,
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
enum policy_rule_list policy_rule)
{
int i = 0;
@@ -790,17 +794,18 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
/* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */
if (ima_policy)
- add_rules(dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules),
+ add_rules(NULL,
+ dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
switch (ima_policy) {
case ORIGINAL_TCB:
- add_rules(original_measurement_rules,
+ add_rules(NULL, original_measurement_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
break;
case DEFAULT_TCB:
- add_rules(default_measurement_rules,
+ add_rules(NULL, default_measurement_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
default:
@@ -817,7 +822,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
if (!arch_entries)
pr_info("No architecture policies found\n");
else
- add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries,
+ add_rules(NULL, arch_policy_entry, arch_entries,
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
/*
@@ -825,7 +830,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
* signatures, prior to other appraise rules.
*/
if (ima_use_secure_boot)
- add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules),
+ add_rules(NULL,
+ secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
/*
@@ -837,23 +843,25 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
build_appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules);
if (build_appraise_entries) {
if (ima_use_secure_boot)
- add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
+ add_rules(NULL,
+ build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
else
- add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
+ add_rules(NULL,
+ build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
}
if (ima_use_appraise_tcb)
- add_rules(default_appraise_rules,
+ add_rules(NULL, default_appraise_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
- ima_update_policy_flag();
+ ima_update_policy_flag(NULL);
}
/* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
-int ima_check_policy(void)
+int ima_check_policy(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -889,7 +897,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
*/
kfree(arch_policy_entry);
}
- ima_update_policy_flag();
+ ima_update_policy_flag(NULL);
/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */
ima_process_queued_keys();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
index 69a8626a35c0..34ca54ba52b7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
entry->payload_len,
entry->keyring_name,
KEY_CHECK, 0,
- entry->keyring_name);
+ entry->keyring_name,
+ NULL);
list_del(&entry->list);
ima_free_key_entry(entry);
}
--
2.20.1
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