[PATCH v13 2/7] proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace

Eric W. Biederman ebiederm at xmission.com
Thu Apr 23 12:16:07 UTC 2020


I took a quick look and there is at least one other use in security/tomoyo/realpath.c:

static char *tomoyo_get_local_path(struct dentry *dentry, char * const buffer,
				   const int buflen)
{
	struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
	char *pos = tomoyo_get_dentry_path(dentry, buffer, buflen);

	if (IS_ERR(pos))
		return pos;
	/* Convert from $PID to self if $PID is current thread. */
	if (sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC && *pos == '/') {
		char *ep;
		const pid_t pid = (pid_t) simple_strtoul(pos + 1, &ep, 10);

		if (*ep == '/' && pid && pid ==
		    task_tgid_nr_ns(current, sb->s_fs_info)) {
			pos = ep - 5;
			if (pos < buffer)
				goto out;
			memmove(pos, "/self", 5);
		}
		goto prepend_filesystem_name;
	}

Can you make the fixes to locks.c and tomoyo a couple of standalone
fixes that should be inserted before your patch?

On the odd chance there is a typo they will bisect better, as well
as just keeping this patch and it's description from expanding in size.
So that things are small enough for people to really look at and review.

The fix itself looks fine.

Thank you,
Eric


Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey at gmail.com> writes:

> Fixed getting proc_pidns in the lock_get_status() and locks_show() directly from
> the superblock, which caused a crash:
>
> === arm64 ===
> [12140.366814] LTP: starting proc01 (proc01 -m 128)
> [12149.580943] ==================================================================
> [12149.589521] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in pid_nr_ns+0x2c/0x90 pid_nr_ns at kernel/pid.c:456
> [12149.595939] Read of size 4 at addr 1bff000bfa8c0388 by task = proc01/50298
> [12149.603392] Pointer tag: [1b], memory tag: [fe]
>
> [12149.610906] CPU: 69 PID: 50298 Comm: proc01 Tainted: G L 5.7.0-rc2-next-20200422 #6
> [12149.620585] Hardware name: HPE Apollo 70 /C01_APACHE_MB , BIOS L50_5.13_1.11 06/18/2019
> [12149.631074] Call trace:
> [12149.634304]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x22c
> [12149.638745]  show_stack+0x28/0x34
> [12149.642839]  dump_stack+0x104/0x194
> [12149.647110]  print_address_description+0x70/0x3a4
> [12149.652576]  __kasan_report+0x188/0x238
> [12149.657169]  kasan_report+0x3c/0x58
> [12149.661430]  check_memory_region+0x98/0xa0
> [12149.666303]  __hwasan_load4_noabort+0x18/0x20
> [12149.671431]  pid_nr_ns+0x2c/0x90
> [12149.675446]  locks_translate_pid+0xf4/0x1a0
> [12149.680382]  locks_show+0x68/0x110
> [12149.684536]  seq_read+0x380/0x930
> [12149.688604]  pde_read+0x5c/0x78
> [12149.692498]  proc_reg_read+0x74/0xc0
> [12149.696813]  __vfs_read+0x84/0x1d0
> [12149.700939]  vfs_read+0xec/0x124
> [12149.704889]  ksys_read+0xb0/0x120
> [12149.708927]  __arm64_sys_read+0x54/0x88
> [12149.713485]  do_el0_svc+0x128/0x1dc
> [12149.717697]  el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
> [12149.722428]  el0_sync+0x164/0x180
>
> [12149.728672] Allocated by task 1:
> [12149.732624]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x124/0x188
> [12149.737269]  kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x18
> [12149.741568]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2e4/0x3d4
> [12149.746820]  proc_fill_super+0x48/0x1fc
> [12149.751377]  vfs_get_super+0xcc/0x170
> [12149.755760]  get_tree_nodev+0x28/0x34
> [12149.760143]  proc_get_tree+0x24/0x30
> [12149.764439]  vfs_get_tree+0x54/0x158
> [12149.768736]  do_mount+0x80c/0xaf0
> [12149.772774]  __arm64_sys_mount+0xe0/0x18c
> [12149.777504]  do_el0_svc+0x128/0x1dc
> [12149.781715]  el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
> [12149.786445]  el0_sync+0x164/0x180

> diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c
> index b8a31c1c4fff..399c5dbb72c4 100644
> --- a/fs/locks.c
> +++ b/fs/locks.c
> @@ -2823,7 +2823,7 @@ static void lock_get_status(struct seq_file *f, struct file_lock *fl,
>  {
>  	struct inode *inode = NULL;
>  	unsigned int fl_pid;
> -	struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = file_inode(f->file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
> +	struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(f->file));
>  
>  	fl_pid = locks_translate_pid(fl, proc_pidns);
>  	/*
> @@ -2901,7 +2901,7 @@ static int locks_show(struct seq_file *f, void *v)
>  {
>  	struct locks_iterator *iter = f->private;
>  	struct file_lock *fl, *bfl;
> -	struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = file_inode(f->file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
> +	struct pid_namespace *proc_pidns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(f->file));
>  
>  	fl = hlist_entry(v, struct file_lock, fl_link);
>  

Eric



More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list