Problem with 9ba09998baa9 ("selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook") in linux-next
Paul Moore
paul at paul-moore.com
Fri Apr 17 16:59:10 UTC 2020
On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 12:32 PM Richard Haines
<richard_c_haines at btinternet.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2020-04-17 at 11:48 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > I just notice that the "selinux: Implement the watch_key security
> > hook" patch made it's way into linux-next via 9ba09998baa9:
> >
> > commit 9ba09998baa995518d94c9a32e6329b28ccb9045
> > Author: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> > Date: Tue Jan 14 17:07:13 2020 +0000
> >
> > selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
> >
> > Implement the watch_key security hook to make sure that a key
> > grants the
> > caller View permission in order to set a watch on a key.
> >
> > For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left
> > unimplemented as
> > it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is
> > global and
> > didn't previously exist.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> > Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds at tycho.nsa.gov>
> >
> > I'm reasonably confident that this code hasn't been tested as I
> > expect
> > it would fail, or at the very least behave in unintended ways. The
> > problem is the selinux_watch_key(...) function, shown below:
>
> I built an selinx-testsuite test for this last year and it worked fine
> then. I'll send the test as an RFC patch as its been some time since I
> ran it. David also has a test in kernel
> samples/watch_queue/watch_test.c
See below.
> > +static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
> > +{
> > + struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
> > + u32 sid = current_sid();
> > +
> > + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> > + sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY,
> > KEY_NEED_VIEW, NULL);
> > +}
> >
> > ... in particular it is the fifth argument to avc_has_perm(),
> > "KEY_NEED_VIEW" which is a problem. KEY_NEED_VIEW is not a SELinux
>
> True, however by magic the KEY_NEED_* perms match with the bits defined
> in classmap.h. I did some work on this during the 'keys' saga, see
> various emails in list like [1]
>
> [1]
> https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20200220181031.156674-2-richard_c_haines@btinternet.com/
Esh, relying on the constants to line up is a recipe for disaster. We
really need that permission translation layer.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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