[RFC] IMA: New IMA measurements for dm-crypt and selinux

[Lev R. Oshvang .]

On Sat, Apr 11, 2020 at 10:07 PM Stephen Smalley
<stephen.smalley at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 8, 2020 at 6:28 AM Tushar Sugandhi
> <tusharsu at linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> > Measuring SELinux status and various SELinux policies can help ensure
> > mandatory access control of the system is not compromised.
> <snip>
> > B. Measuring selinux constructs:
> >      We propose to add an IMA hook in enforcing_set() present under
> >      security/selinux/include/security.h.
> >      enforcing_set() sets the selinux state to enforcing/permissive etc.
> >      and is called from key places like selinux_init(),
> >      sel_write_enforce() etc.
> >      The hook will measure various attributes related to selinux status.
> >      Majority of the attributes are present in the struct selinux_state
> >      present in security/selinux/include/security.h
> >      e.g.
> >      $sestatus
> >             SELinux status:              enabled
> >             SELinuxfs mount:             /sys/fs/selinux
> >             SELinux root directory:      /etc/selinux
> >             Loaded policy name:          default
> >             Current mode:                permissive
> >             Mode from config file:       permissive
> >             Policy MLS status:           enabled
> >             Policy deny_unknown status:  allowed
> >             Memory protection checking:  requested (insecure)
> >             Max kernel policy version:   32
> >
> >      The above attributes will be serialized into a set of key=value
> >      pairs when passed to IMA for measurement.
> >
> >      Proposed Function Signature of the IMA hook:
> >      void ima_selinux_status(void *selinux_status, int len);
>
> This won't detect changes to any of these state variables via a kernel
> write vulnerability,
> so it would be good to provide a way to trigger measurement of the
> current values on
> demand.
> You'll also likely want to measure parts of the child structures of
> selinux_state, e.g. selinux_ss,
> especially selinux_map and policydb.  You can simplify measurement of
> the policydb by
> serializing it first via policydb_write() and hashing the result. I
> suppose one question is whether you can do all of this
> already from userspace by just having userspace read
> /sys/fs/selinux/enforce, /sys/fs/selinux/policy, etc.

It sees to me that  LKRG (kernel run time guard)  takes the role of
measuring kernel structures.  Perhaps you need to consult with LKRG
guys.
Lev.