[RFC] IMA: New IMA measurements for dm-crypt and selinux
gmazyland at gmail.com
Wed Apr 8 16:28:03 UTC 2020
On 08/04/2020 12:19, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> The goals of the kernel integrity subsystem are to detect if files have
> been accidentally or maliciously altered, both remotely and locally,
> appraise a file's measurement against a "good" value stored as an
> extended attribute, and enforce local file integrity .
> To achieve these goals, IMA subsystem measures several in-memory
> constructs and files.
> We propose to measure constructs in dm-crypt and selinux to further
> enhance measuring capabilities of IMA.
> A. Measuring dmcrypt constructs:
> We can add an IMA hook in crypt_ctr() present in
> drivers/md/dm-crypt.c, so that IMA can start measuring the status of
> various dm-crypt targets (represented by crypt_target struct - also
> defined in dm-crypt.c).
I do not think you should just cherry-pick dm-crypt here. What about other
device-mapper targets? Apparently, dm-verity or dm-integrity are obvious
But device-mapper logic is based on stacking devices, so in generic case
(not just in some very special embedded configuration) you need to measure
the whole stack of devices.
(Just imagine a target stacked below dm-crypt that decrypts the device or so. :-)
Moreover, dm-crypt allows some specific actions like wiping and reloading
of the encryption key through device-mapper dm-crypt message.
If you check parameter only in crypt_ctr, this message path must be disabled,
basically crippling dm-crypt functionality (it is intended to wipe key in-memory
during hw suspend).
IMO if you want implement something like IMA measurement, I think you should
implement it in device-mapper core, and provide support for all targets.
I guess some new target specific callback is needed and some flags that
could enforce/disable stacking if a IMA measurement is in place etc.
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