[PATCH v6 00/12] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 05:21:32PM +0100, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 09, 2019 at 01:16:48PM +0100, James Bottomley wrote:
> > Link to previous cover letter:
> > 
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/1540193596.3202.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
> > 
> > This is marked v6 instead of v5 because I did a v5 after feedback on v4
> > but didn't get around to posting it and then had to rework the whole of
> > the kernel space handling while I was on holiday.  I also added the
> > documentation of how the whole thing works and the rationale for doing
> > it in tpm-security.rst (patch 11).  The main reason for doing this now
> > is so we have something to discuss at Plumbers.
> > 
> > The new patch set implements the various splits requested, but the main
> > changes are that the kernel space is gone and is replaced by a context
> > save and restore of the generated null seed.  This is easier to handle
> > than a full kernel space given the new threading for TPM spaces, but
> > conceptually it is still very like a space.  I've also made whether
> > integrity and encryption is turned on a Kconfig option.
> > 
> > James
> 
> So... is there a changelog for the revisions?

This also desperately needs a cover letter with the full rationale and
not just a link to an aged cover letter. I have bigger problems with the
form than the function ATM.

TPM's threat model does not cover hardware attacks. It is hardware
designed to give some protection against software attacks. If I were
sending these patches I would start to look for an angle from that
perspective.

/Jarkko