[PATCH] tracefs: Do not allocate and free proxy_ops for lockdown

Steven Rostedt rostedt at goodmis.org
Fri Oct 11 22:27:48 UTC 2019


On Fri, 11 Oct 2019 23:46:20 +0200
Florian Weimer <fw at deneb.enyo.de> wrote:

> * Steven Rostedt:
> 
> > Once locked down is set, can it ever be undone without rebooting?  
> 
> I think this is the original intent with such patches, yes.  But then
> reality interferes and people add some escape hatch, so that it's
> possible again to load arbitrary kernel modules.  And for servers, you
> can't have a meaningful physical presence check, so you end up with a
> lot of complexity for something that offers absolutely zero gains in
> security.
> 
> The other practical issue is that general-purpose Linux distributions
> cannot prevent kernel downgrades, so even if there's a
> cryptographically signed chain from the firmware to the kernel, you
> can boot last year's kernel, use a root-to-ring-0 exploit to disable
> its particular implementation of lockdown, and then kexec the real
> kernel with lockdown disabled.
> 
> I'm sure that kernel lockdown has applications somewhere, but for
> general-purpose distributions (who usually want to support third-party
> kernel modules), it's an endless source of problems that wouldn't
> exist without it.

I just decided to keep the two separate. The tracing_disable is
permanent (unless you actually do something that writes into kernel
memory to change the variable). When set, there's nothing to clear it.

Thus, I decided not to couple that with lockdown, and let the lockdown
folks do whatever they damn well please ;-)

-- Steve



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