SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 2:16 PM Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson at intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 12:20:45PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 11:01 AM Sean Christopherson
> > <sean.j.christopherson at intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 09:14:10AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > > Enclave file -- that is, the file backing the vma from which the data is loaded.
> > >
> > > It wasn't explicitly called out in Andy's proposal(s), but the idea is
> > > that the SGX driver would effectively inherit permissions from the source
> > > VMA (EADD needs a source for the initial value of the encave page).
> >
> > I actually meant for it to *not* work like this.  I don't want the
> > source VMA to have to be VM_EXEC.  I think the LSM should just check
> > permissions on ->vm_file.
>
> But if ->vm_file is NULL, i.e. the enclave is not backed by a file,
> then PROCESS__EXECMEM is required (or more likely, ENCLAVE__EXECMEM).
>

If ->vm_file is NULL, then I think some privilege is needed.  I
suppose the policy could have a new lesser permission EXECUNTRUSTED
which is like EXECMOD but you can't modify it.  I'm not convinced this
is particular important.