SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com
Wed May 22 13:20:22 UTC 2019
On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 08:51:40AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Except that mmap() is more or less required to guarantee that ELRANGE
> established by ECREATE is available. And we want to disallow mmap() as
> soon as the first EADD is done so that userspace can't remap the enclave's
> VMAs via munmap()->mmap() and gain execute permissions to pages that were
> EADD'd as NX.
We don't want to guarantee such thing and it is not guaranteed. It does
not fit at all to the multi process work done. Enclaves are detached
from any particular process addresse spaces. It is responsibility of
process to open windows to them.
That would be completely against work that we've done lately.
> Actually, conceptually it's probably more intuitive to disallow mmap() at
> ECREATE, i.e. the act of creating an enclave pins the associated virtual
> address range until the enclave is destroyed.
/Jarkko
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