[PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
James Morris
jmorris at namei.org
Thu May 2 23:19:49 UTC 2019
On Thu, 2 May 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 2:07 PM James Morris <jmorris at namei.org> wrote:
> > One possible direction is to (as previously mentioned) assign IDs to each
> > callsite and be able to check this ID against a simple policy array
> > (allow/deny). The default policy choices could be reduced to 'all' or
> > 'none' during kconfig, and allow a custom policy to be loaded later if
> > desired.
>
> Ok. My primary concern around this is that it's very difficult to use
> correctly in anything other than the "all" or "none" modes. If a new
> kernel feature is added with integrated lockdown support, if an admin
> is simply setting the flags of things they wish to block then this
> will be left enabled - and may violate the admin's expectations around
> integrity. On the other hand, if an admin is simply setting the flags
> of things they wish to permit, then adding lockdown support to an
> existing kernel feature may result in that feature suddenly being
> disabled, which may also violate the admin's expectations around the
> flags providing a stable set of behaviour.
Understood. Most uses will likely be either a distro or an embedded
system, who I'm assuming would provide a useful policy by default, and
perhaps a high-level abstraction for modification.
> Given that, would you prefer such a policy expression to look like?
Perhaps a write-once policy, injected from userspace during early boot?
The policy could be simply a list of:
lockdown_feature true|false
>
> > Within the policy check hook, we could add a new LSM hook, which would
> > allow an LSM to restrictively override the lockdown policy with its own
>
> Ok, that makes sense. If we take this approach, does there need to be
> a separate policy mechanism at all? Users who want fine-grained
> control would be able to set the behaviour to "None" and then use
> their choice of LSM to express more fine-grained control.
Right, and there could be a stackable LSM which just does fine-grained
policy (per above).
>
> > This doesn't really address the completeness / maintenance issue (i.e. "do
> > we have everything covered and how do we ensure this on an ongoing
> > basis?", and "what will this new lockdown feature break?"), although it
> > should make it easier to add new lockdown callsites as they don't have to
> > be enabled by the user.
>
> I can start on this.
Cool!
--
James Morris
<jmorris at namei.org>
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