[PATCH v3 1/2] LSM: mark all set*uid call sites in kernel/sys.c
mortonm at chromium.org
mortonm at chromium.org
Tue Jan 15 18:04:21 UTC 2019
From: Micah Morton <mortonm at chromium.org>
This change ensures that the set*uid family of syscalls in kernel/sys.c
(setreuid, setuid, setresuid, setfsuid) all call ns_capable_common with
the CAP_OPT_INSETID flag, so capability checks in the security_capable
hook can know whether they are being called from within a set*uid
syscall. This change is a no-op by itself, but is needed for the
proposed SafeSetID LSM.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm at chromium.org>
---
These changes used to be part of the main SafeSetID LSM patch set.
include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++
kernel/capability.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
kernel/sys.c | 10 +++++-----
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index f640dcbc880c..c3f9a4d558a0 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
#else
static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
@@ -240,6 +241,10 @@ static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
}
+static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+ return true;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode);
extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 7718d7dcadc7..e0734ace5bc2 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -417,6 +417,25 @@ bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
+/**
+ * ns_capable_setid - Determine if the current task has a superior capability
+ * in effect, while signalling that this check is being done from within a
+ * setid syscall.
+ * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ */
+bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+ return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_INSETID);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_setid);
+
/**
* capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index a48cbf1414b8..a98061c1a124 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
new->uid = kruid;
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
!uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
- !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
+ !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
goto error;
}
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
!uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
!uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
- !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
+ !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
goto error;
}
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
retval = set_user(new);
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
!uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid))
goto error;
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
- ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
+ ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
new->fsuid = kuid;
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
--
2.20.1.97.g81188d93c3-goog
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