[PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading
Borislav Petkov
bp at alien8.de
Mon Feb 11 18:29:56 UTC 2019
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading
For your next submission, please fix all your subjects:
The tip tree preferred format for patch subject prefixes is
'subsys/component:', e.g. 'x86/apic:', 'x86/mm/fault:', 'sched/fair:',
'genirq/core:'. Please do not use file names or complete file paths as
prefix. 'git log path/to/file' should give you a reasonable hint in most
cases.
The condensed patch description in the subject line should start with a
uppercase letter and should be written in imperative tone.
On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 04:34:12PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> From: Nadav Amit <namit at vmware.com>
>
> When modules and BPF filters are loaded, there is a time window in
> which some memory is both writable and executable. An attacker that has
> already found another vulnerability (e.g., a dangling pointer) might be
> able to exploit this behavior to overwrite kernel code.
>
> Prevent having writable executable PTEs in this stage. In addition,
> avoiding having W+X mappings can also slightly simplify the patching of
> modules code on initialization (e.g., by alternatives and static-key),
> as would be done in the next patch.
>
> To avoid having W+X mappings, set them initially as RW (NX) and after
> they are set as RO set them as X as well. Setting them as executable is
> done as a separate step to avoid one core in which the old PTE is cached
> (hence writable), and another which sees the updated PTE (executable),
> which would break the W^X protection.
>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz at infradead.org>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat at kernel.org>
> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx at linutronix.de>
> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit at vmware.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe at intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
> arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/filter.h | 2 +-
> kernel/module.c | 5 +++++
> 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> index 76d482a2b716..69f3e650ada8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -667,15 +667,29 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(void)
> * handlers seeing an inconsistent instruction while you patch.
> */
> void *__init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
> - size_t len)
> + size_t len)
> {
> unsigned long flags;
> - local_irq_save(flags);
> - memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
> - local_irq_restore(flags);
> - sync_core();
> - /* Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but
> - that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs. */
> +
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX) &&
Not a fast path - boot_cpu_has() is fine here.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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