[PATCH] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules
zohar at linux.ibm.com
Tue Feb 5 18:52:21 UTC 2019
On Tue, 2019-02-05 at 12:32 -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 05, 2019 at 11:47:24AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Seth,
> > On Tue, 2019-02-05 at 09:18 -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 02:18:59PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > Require signed kernel modules on systems with secure boot mode enabled.
> > > >
> > > > To coordinate between appended kernel module signatures and IMA
> > > > signatures, only define an IMA MODULE_CHECK policy rule if
> > > > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not enabled.
> > > >
> > > > This patch defines a function named set_module_sig_required() and renames
> > > > is_module_sig_enforced() to is_module_sig_enforced_or_required(). The
> > > > call to set_module_sig_required() is dependent on CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> > > > being enabled.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.ibm.com>
> > >
> > > With respect to interactions with the kernel lockdown patches, this
> > > looks better than the patches I saw previously. I don't feel like I know
> > > enough about what's going on with IMA to ack the patch, but I feel
> > > confident that it's at least not going to break signature enforcement
> > > for us.
> > Thank you for testing! Could this be translated into a "tested-by"
> > "(for w/lockdown patches)"?
> Yeah, that's fine. To be clear about what I tested, I've confirmed that
> it doesn't interfere with requiring signed modules under lockdown with
> CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=n and IMA appraisal enabled.
> Tested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee at canonical.com>
Oh! You've disabled the coordination of the two signature
verification methods. Any chance you could test with
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