[PATCH v2] tpm/tpm_crb: Avoid unaligned reads in crb_recv()

Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com
Mon Feb 4 23:24:11 UTC 2019


On Mon, Feb 04, 2019 at 10:09:51PM +0000, Winkler, Tomas wrote:
> > 
> > The current approach to read first 6 bytes from the response and then tail of
> > the response, can cause the 2nd memcpy_fromio() to do an unaligned read
> > (e.g. read 32-bit word from address aligned to a 16-bits), depending on how
> > memcpy_fromio() is implemented. If this happens, the read will fail and the
> > memory controller will fill the read with 1's.
> > 
> > This was triggered by 170d13ca3a2f, which should be probably refined to check
> > and react to the address alignment. Before that commit, on x86
> > memcpy_fromio() turned out to be memcpy(). By a luck GCC has done the right
> > thing (from tpm_crb's perspective) for us so far, but we should not rely on that.
> > Thus, it makes sense to fix this also in tpm_crb, not least because the fix can be
> > then backported to stable kernels and make them more robust when compiled
> > in differing environments.
> > 
> > Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
> > Cc: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler at intel.com>
> > Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel at redhat.com>
> > Fixes: 30fc8d138e91 ("tpm: TPM 2.0 CRB Interface")
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen at linux.intel.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel at redhat.com>
> After fixing the typos you can add my ack. 
> Thanks
> Tomas
> 
> > ---
> > v2:
> > * There was a trailing double colon in the end of the short summary.
> > * Check requested and expected length against TPM_HEADER_SIZE.
> > * Add some explanatory comments to crb_recv().
> >  drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
> >  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c index
> > 36952ef98f90..c084e61299aa 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
> > @@ -287,19 +287,29 @@ static int crb_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
> > size_t count)
> >  	struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
> >  	unsigned int expected;
> > 
> > -	/* sanity check */
> > -	if (count < 6)
> > +	/* A sanity check that the upper layer wants to get at least the header
> > +	 * as that is the minimum size for any TPM response.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (count < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
> >  		return -EIO;
> > 
> > +	/* If this bit is set, according to the spec, the TPM is in unrecovable
>                                                                                                      ^^^ typo ^^^^
> > +	 * condition.
> > +	 */
> >  	if (ioread32(&priv->regs_t->ctrl_sts) & CRB_CTRL_STS_ERROR)
> >  		return -EIO;
> > 
> > -	memcpy_fromio(buf, priv->rsp, 6);
> > -	expected = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf[2]);
> > -	if (expected > count || expected < 6)
> > +	/* Read 8 bytes (not just 6 bytes, which would cover ^^^ tag and^^^ the response
> > length
> > +	 * field ^^^s^^^) in order to make sure that the reminding memory accesses
>                                                                              ^^^ remaining^^^  
> > will
> > +	 * be aligned.
> > +	 */
> > +	memcpy_fromio(buf, priv->rsp, 8);
> > +
> > +	expected = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf[2]);
> > +	if (expected > count || expected < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
> >  		return -EIO;
> > 
> > -	memcpy_fromio(&buf[6], &priv->rsp[6], expected - 6);
> > +	memcpy_fromio(&buf[8], &priv->rsp[8], expected - 8);
> > 
> >  	return expected;
> >  }
> > --
> > 2.19.1
> 

Thanks!

/Jarkko



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