[PATCH V40 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down

[Matthew Garrett]

Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so
restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by
preventing open().

(Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in
default_file_open())

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59 at google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt at goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk>
---
 fs/tracefs/inode.c           | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/security.h     |  1 +
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c |  1 +
 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c
index a5bab190a297..761af8ce4015 100644
--- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/parser.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #define TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE	0700
 
@@ -27,6 +28,25 @@ static struct vfsmount *tracefs_mount;
 static int tracefs_mount_count;
 static bool tracefs_registered;
 
+static int default_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry;
+	struct file_operations *real_fops;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	real_fops = dentry->d_fsdata;
+	if (!real_fops->open)
+		return 0;
+	return real_fops->open(inode, filp);
+}
+
 static ssize_t default_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -221,6 +241,12 @@ static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void tracefs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		kfree(inode->i_fop);
+}
+
 static int tracefs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -257,6 +283,7 @@ static int tracefs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
 static const struct super_operations tracefs_super_operations = {
 	.statfs		= simple_statfs,
 	.remount_fs	= tracefs_remount,
+	.destroy_inode  = tracefs_destroy_inode,
 	.show_options	= tracefs_show_options,
 };
 
@@ -387,6 +414,7 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
 				   struct dentry *parent, void *data,
 				   const struct file_operations *fops)
 {
+	struct file_operations *proxy_fops;
 	struct dentry *dentry;
 	struct inode *inode;
 
@@ -402,8 +430,20 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
 	if (unlikely(!inode))
 		return failed_creating(dentry);
 
+	proxy_fops = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_operations), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!proxy_fops)) {
+		iput(inode);
+		return failed_creating(dentry);
+	}
+
+	if (!fops)
+		fops = &tracefs_file_operations;
+
+	dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)fops;
+	memcpy(proxy_fops, fops, sizeof(*proxy_fops));
+	proxy_fops->open = default_open_file;
 	inode->i_mode = mode;
-	inode->i_fop = fops ? fops : &tracefs_file_operations;
+	inode->i_fop = proxy_fops;
 	inode->i_private = data;
 	d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
 	fsnotify_create(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 152824b6f456..429f9f03372b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
 	LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
 	LOCKDOWN_PERF,
+	LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
 
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index edd1fff0147d..84df03b1f5a7 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
 	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
 	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
 	[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
+	[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };
 
-- 
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog