[RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.

[Jaskaran Singh Khurana]

Hello Mike,
On Tue, 25 Jun 2019, Mike Snitzer wrote:

> On Wed, Jun 19 2019 at  3:10pm -0400,
> Jaskaran Khurana <jaskarankhurana at linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
>> The verification is to support cases where the roothash is not secured by
>> Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
>> One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after boot,
>> the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume has to
>> be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be used
>> before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be created.
>>
>> The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash and
>> must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed.
>>
>> The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed to
>> the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification.
>>
>> Kernel commandline parameter will indicate whether to check (only if
>> specified) or force (for all dm verity volumes) roothash signature
>> verification.
>>
>> Kernel commandline: dm_verity.verify_sig=1 or 2 for check/force root hash
>> signature validation respectively.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jaskaran Khurana <jaskarankhurana at linux.microsoft.com>
>
> Milan and/or others: could you please provide review and if you're OK
> with this patch respond accordingly?
>

The v7 of this patch was Reviewed and Tested by Milan Broz. Could you tell 
me when this will be merged/next steps, if required I can post the patches 
again.

> Thanks,
> Mike
>
Regards,
Jaskaran