[PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering
Stephen Smalley
sds at tycho.nsa.gov
Fri Sep 28 20:25:41 UTC 2018
On 09/28/2018 04:01 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 8:55 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 9/24/2018 5:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> v3:
>>> - add CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE and refactor resulting logic
>>
>> Kees, you can add my
>>
>> Reviewed-by:Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>
>>
>> for this entire patch set. Thank you for taking this on, it's
>> a significant and important chunk of the LSM infrastructure
>> update.
>
> Thanks!
>
> John, you'd looked at this a bit too -- do the results line up with
> your expectations?
>
> Any thoughts from SELinux, TOMOYO, or IMA folks?
What's it relative to? First patch fails for me on current security/next.
Is there a branch in your repo that has the v3 patches?
>
> -Kees
>
>>
>>
>>> ...
>>> Breakdown of patches:
>>>
>>> Infrastructure improvements (no logical changes):
>>> LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
>>> vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
>>> LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
>>> LSM: Remove initcall tracing
>>> LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
>>> vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
>>> LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
>>> LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
>>> LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
>>> LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
>>>
>>> Split "integrity" out into "ordered initialization" (no logical changes):
>>> LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR
>>> LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization
>>>
>>> Provide centralized LSM enable/disable infrastructure:
>>> LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce"
>>> LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state
>>> LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs
>>> LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling
>>> LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE
>>> LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable=
>>> LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic
>>> LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable
>>>
>>> Provide centralized LSM ordering infrastructure:
>>> LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init
>>> LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER
>>> LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering
>>>
>>> Move minor LSMs into ordered LSM initialization:
>>> LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM
>>> Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM
>>> LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order
>>> capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST
>>>
>>> Move major LSMs into ordered LSM initialization:
>>> LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM
>>> LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
>>>
>>> -Kees
>>>
>>> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 +
>>> arch/arc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
>>> arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S | 1 -
>>> arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
>>> arch/h8300/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
>>> arch/microblaze/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 -
>>> arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 -
>>> arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S | 2 -
>>> arch/xtensa/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
>>> include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 25 +-
>>> include/linux/init.h | 2 -
>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 43 ++-
>>> include/linux/module.h | 1 -
>>> security/Kconfig | 61 ++-
>>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 16 +-
>>> security/commoncap.c | 8 +-
>>> security/integrity/iint.c | 5 +-
>>> security/loadpin/Kconfig | 4 +-
>>> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 28 +-
>>> security/security.c | 351 +++++++++++++++---
>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +-
>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +-
>>> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 7 +-
>>> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +-
>>> 24 files changed, 438 insertions(+), 175 deletions(-)
>>>
>>
>
>
>
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