[PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering
Martin Steigerwald
martin at lichtvoll.de
Thu Sep 20 20:14:46 UTC 2018
Kees Cook - 20.09.18, 18:23:
> v2:
> - add "lsm.order=" and CONFIG_LSM_ORDER instead of overloading
> "security=" - reorganize introduction of ordering logic code
>
> Updated cover letter:
>
> This refactors the LSM registration and initialization infrastructure
> to more centrally support different LSM types. What was considered a
> "major" LSM is kept for legacy use of the "security=" boot parameter,
> and now overlaps with the new class of "exclusive" LSMs for the future
> blob sharing (to be added later). The "minor" LSMs become more well
> defined as a result of the refactoring.
>
> Instead of continuing to (somewhat improperly) overload the kernel's
> initcall system, this changes the LSM infrastructure to store a
> registration structure (struct lsm_info) table instead, where metadata
> about each LSM can be recorded (name, flags, order, enable flag, init
> function). This can be extended in the future to include things like
> required blob size for the coming "blob sharing" LSMs.
I read the cover letter and still don´t know what this is about. Now I
am certainly not engaged deeply with LSM. I bet my main missing piece
is: What is a "blob sharing" LSM.
I think it would improve the cover letter greatly if it explains briefly
what is a major LSM, what is a minor LSM and what is a "blob sharing"
LSM.
Why those are all needed? What is the actual security or end user
benefit of this work? The questions are not to question your work. I bet
it makes all perfect sense. I just did not understand its sense from
reading the cover letter.
> The "major" LSMs had to individually negotiate which of them should be
> enabled. This didn't provide a way to negotiate combinations of other
> LSMs (as will be needed for "blob sharing" LSMs). This is solved by
> providing the LSM infrastructure with all the details needed to make
> the choice (exposing the per-LSM "enabled" flag, if used, the LSM
> characteristics, and ordering expectations).
>
> As a result of the refactoring, the "minor" LSMs are able to remove
> the open-coded security_add_hooks() calls for "capability", "yama",
> and "loadpin", and to redefine "integrity" properly as a general LSM.
> (Note that "integrity" actually defined _no_ hooks, but needs the
> early initialization).
>
> With all LSMs being proessed centrally, it was possible to implement
> a new boot parameter "lsm.order=" to provide explicit ordering, which
> is helpful for the future "blob sharing" LSMs. Matching this is the
> new CONFIG_LSM_ORDER, which replaces CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, as it
> provides a higher granularity of control.
>
> To better show LSMs activation some debug reporting was added (enabled
> with the "lsm.debug" boot commandline option).
>
> Finally, I added a WARN() around LSM initialization failures, which
> appear to have always been silently ignored. (Realistically any LSM
> init failures would have only been due to catastrophic kernel issues
> that would render a system unworkable anyway, but it'd be better to
> expose the problem as early as possible.)
>
> -Kees
>
> Kees Cook (26):
> LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
> vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
> LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
> LSM: Remove initcall tracing
> LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
> vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
> LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
> LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
> LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
> LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
> LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR
> LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization
> LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state
> LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs
> LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable=
> LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic
> LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable
> LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init
> LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER
> LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering
> LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM
> Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM
> LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order
> capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST
> LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM
> LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
>
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +
> arch/arc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
> arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S | 1 -
> arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
> arch/h8300/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
> arch/microblaze/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 -
> arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 -
> arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S | 2 -
> arch/xtensa/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
> include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 25 +-
> include/linux/init.h | 2 -
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 43 ++-
> include/linux/module.h | 1 -
> security/Kconfig | 42 +--
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 16 +-
> security/commoncap.c | 8 +-
> security/integrity/iint.c | 5 +-
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 10 +-
> security/security.c | 304
> ++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c |
> 16 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +-
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 7 +-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +-
> 23 files changed, 348 insertions(+), 164 deletions(-)
--
Martin
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