[RFC 01/12] docs/x86: Document the Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API
Huang, Kai
kai.huang at intel.com
Tue Sep 11 01:14:44 UTC 2018
On Mon, 2018-09-10 at 17:45 -0700, Alison Schofield wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 05:33:33PM -0700, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-linux-mm at kvack.org [mailto:owner-linux-mm at kvack.org]
> > > On
> > > Behalf Of Alison Schofield
> > > Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2018 12:13 PM
> > > To: Huang, Kai <kai.huang at intel.com>
> > > Cc: dhowells at redhat.com; tglx at linutronix.de; Nakajima, Jun
> > > <jun.nakajima at intel.com>; Shutemov, Kirill <kirill.shutemov at intel
> > > .com>;
> > > Hansen, Dave <dave.hansen at intel.com>; Sakkinen, Jarkko
> > > <jarkko.sakkinen at intel.com>; jmorris at namei.org; keyrings at vger.ker
> > > nel.org;
> > > linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org; mingo at redhat.com; hpa at zyto
> > > r.com;
> > > x86 at kernel.org; linux-mm at kvack.org
> > > Subject: Re: [RFC 01/12] docs/x86: Document the Multi-Key Total
> > > Memory
> > > Encryption API
> > >
> > > On Sun, Sep 09, 2018 at 06:28:28PM -0700, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: owner-linux-mm at kvack.org [mailto:owner-linux-mm at kvack.o
> > > > > rg] On
> > > > > Behalf Of Alison Schofield
> > > > > Sent: Saturday, September 8, 2018 10:34 AM
> > > > > To: dhowells at redhat.com; tglx at linutronix.de
> > > > > Cc: Huang, Kai <kai.huang at intel.com>; Nakajima, Jun
> > > > > <jun.nakajima at intel.com>; Shutemov, Kirill
> > > > > <kirill.shutemov at intel.com>; Hansen, Dave <dave.hansen at intel.
> > > > > com>;
> > > > > Sakkinen, Jarkko <jarkko.sakkinen at intel.com>; jmorris at namei.o
> > > > > rg;
> > > > > keyrings at vger.kernel.org; linux-security-module at vger.kernel.o
> > > > > rg;
> > > > > mingo at redhat.com; hpa at zytor.com; x86 at kernel.org; linux-
> > >
> > > mm at kvack.org
> > > > > Subject: [RFC 01/12] docs/x86: Document the Multi-Key Total
> > > > > Memory
> > > > > Encryption API
> > > > >
> > > > > Document the API's used for MKTME on Intel platforms.
> > > > > MKTME: Multi-KEY Total Memory Encryption
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield at intel.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > Documentation/x86/mktme-keys.txt | 153
> > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > 1 file changed, 153 insertions(+)
> > > > > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme-keys.txt
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme-keys.txt
> > > > > b/Documentation/x86/mktme- keys.txt new file mode 100644
> > > > > index
> > > > > 000000000000..2dea7acd2a17
> > > > > --- /dev/null
> > > > > +++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme-keys.txt
> > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
> > > > > +MKTME (Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption) is a technology
> > > > > that
> > > > > +allows memory encryption on Intel platforms. Whereas TME
> > > > > (Total
> > > > > +Memory
> > > > > +Encryption) allows encryption of the entire system memory
> > > > > using a
> > > > > +single key, MKTME allows multiple encryption domains, each
> > > > > having
> > > > > +their own key. The main use case for the feature is virtual
> > > > > machine
> > > > > +isolation. The API's introduced here are intended to offer
> > > > > +flexibility to work in a
> > > > > wide range of uses.
> > > > > +
> > > > > +The externally available Intel Architecture Spec:
> > > > > +https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/a5/16
> > > > > /Multi-
> > > > > +Key-
> > > > > +Total-Memory-Encryption-Spec.pdf
> > > > > +
> > > > > +============================ API Overview
> > > > > +============================
> > > > > +
> > > > > +There are 2 MKTME specific API's that enable userspace to
> > > > > create
> > > > > +and use the memory encryption keys:
> > > > > +
> > > > > +1) Kernel Key Service: MKTME Type
> > > > > +
> > > > > + MKTME is a new key type added to the existing Kernel Key
> > > > > Services
> > > > > + to support the memory encryption keys. The MKTME service
> > > > > manages
> > > > > + the addition and removal of MKTME keys. It maps userspace
> > > > > keys
> > > > > + to hardware keyids and programs the hardware with user
> > > > > requested
> > > > > + encryption parameters.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o An understanding of the Kernel Key Service is required
> > > > > in order
> > > > > + to use the MKTME key type as it is a subset of that
> > > > > service.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o MKTME keys are a limited resource. There is a single
> > > > > pool of
> > > > > + MKTME keys for a system and that pool can be from 3 to
> > > > > 63 keys.
> > > >
> > > > Why 3 to 63 keys? Architecturally we are able to support up to
> > > > 15-bit keyID,
> > >
> > > although in the first generation server we only support 6-bit
> > > keyID, which is 63
> > > key/keyIDs (excluding keyID 0, which is TME's keyID).
> > >
> > > My understanding is that low level SKU's could have as few as 3
> > > bits available to
> > > hold the keyid, and that the max is 6 bits, hence 64.
> > > I probably don't need to be stating that level of detail here,
> > > but rather just
> > > iterate the important point that the resource is limited!
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > + With that in mind, userspace may take advantage of the
> > > > > kernel
> > > > > + key services sharing and permissions model for
> > > > > userspace keys.
> > > > > + One key can be shared as long as each user has the
> > > > > permission
> > > > > + of "KEY_NEED_VIEW" to use it.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o MKTME key type uses capabilities to restrict the
> > > > > allocation
> > > > > + of keys. It only requires CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, but will
> > > > > accept
> > > > > + the broader capability of CAP_SYS_ADMIN. See
> > > > > capabilities(7).
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o The MKTME key service blocks kernel key service
> > > > > commands that
> > > > > + could lead to reprogramming of in use keys, or loss of
> > > > > keys from
> > > > > + the pool. This means MKTME does not allow a key to be
> > > > > invalidated,
> > > > > + unlinked, or timed out. These operations are blocked by
> > > > > MKTME as
> > > > > + it creates all keys with the internal flag
> > > > > KEY_FLAG_KEEP.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o MKTME does not support the keyctl option of UPDATE.
> > > > > Userspace
> > > > > + may change the programming of a key by revoking it and
> > > > > adding
> > > > > + a new key with the updated encryption options (or vice-
> > > > > versa).
> > > > > +
> > > > > +2) System Call: encrypt_mprotect()
> > > > > +
> > > > > + MKTME encryption is requested by calling
> > > > > encrypt_mprotect(). The
> > > > > + caller passes the serial number to a previously allocated
> > > > > and
> > > > > + programmed encryption key. That handle was created with
> > > > > the MKTME
> > > > > + Key Service.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o The caller must have KEY_NEED_VIEW permission on the
> > > > > key
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o The range of memory that is to be protected must be
> > > > > mapped as
> > > > > + ANONYMOUS. If it is not, the entire encrypt_mprotect()
> > > > > request
> > > > > + fails with EINVAL.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o As an extension to the existing mprotect() system call,
> > > > > + encrypt_mprotect() supports the legacy mprotect
> > > > > behavior plus
> > > > > + the enabling of memory encryption. That means that in
> > > > > addition
> > > > > + to encrypting the memory, the protection flags will be
> > > > > updated
> > > > > + as requested in the call.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + o Additional mprotect() calls to memory already protected
> > > > > with
> > > > > + MKTME will not alter the MKTME status.
> > > >
> > > > I think it's better to separate encrypt_mprotect() into another
> > > > doc so both
> > >
> > > parts can be reviewed easier.
> > >
> > > I can do that.
> > > Also, I do know I need man page for that too.
> > > >
> > > > > +
> > > > > +====================== Usage: MKTME Key Service
> > > > > +======================
> > > > > +
> > > > > +MKTME is enabled on supported Intel platforms by selecting
> > > > > +CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME which selects CONFIG_MKTME_KEYS.
> > > > > +
> > > > > +Allocating MKTME Keys via command line or system call:
> > > > > + keyctl add mktme name "[options]" ring
> > > > > +
> > > > > + key_serial_t add_key(const char *type, const char
> > > > > *description,
> > > > > + const void *payload, size_t plen,
> > > > > + key_serial_t keyring);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +Revoking MKTME Keys via command line or system call::
> > > > > + keyctl revoke <key>
> > > > > +
> > > > > + long keyctl(KEYCTL_REVOKE, key_serial_t key);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +Options Field Definition:
> > > > > + userkey= ASCII HEX value encryption key. Defaults
> > > > > to a CPU
> > > > > + generated key if a userkey is not defined
> > > > > here.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + algorithm= Encryption algorithm name as a string.
> > > > > + Valid algorithm: "aes-xts-128"
> > > > > +
> > > > > + tweak= ASCII HEX value tweak key. Tweak key will
> > > > > be added to the
> > > > > + userkey... (need to be clear here that
> > > > > this is being sent
> > > > > + to the hardware - kernel not messing w it)
> > > > > +
> > > > > + entropy= ascii hex value entropy.
> > > > > + This entropy will be used to generated the
> > > > > CPU key and
> > > > > + the tweak key when CPU generated key is
> > > > > requested.
> > > > > +
> > > > > +Algorithm Dependencies:
> > > > > + AES-XTS 128 is the only supported algorithm.
> > > > > + There are only 2 ways that AES-XTS 128 may be used:
> > > > > +
> > > > > + 1) User specified encryption key
> > > > > + - The user specified encryption key must be exactly
> > > > > + 16 ASCII Hex bytes (128 bits).
> > > > > + - A tweak key must be specified and it must be
> > > > > exactly
> > > > > + 16 ASCII Hex bytes (128 bits).
> > > > > + - No entropy field is accepted.
> > > > > +
> > > > > + 2) CPU generated encryption key
> > > > > + - When no user specified encryption key is provided,
> > > > > the
> > > > > + default encryption key will be CPU generated.
> > > > > + - User must specify 16 ASCII Hex bytes of entropy.
> > > > > This
> > > > > + entropy will be used by the CPU to generate both
> > > > > the
> > > > > + encryption key and the tweak key.
> > > > > + - No entropy field is accepted.
> > >
> > > ^^^^^^^ should be tweak
> > >
> > > >
> > > > This is not true. The spec says in CPU generated random mode,
> > > > both 'key' and
> > >
> > > 'tweak' part are used to generate the final key and tweak
> > > respectively.
> > > >
> > > > Actually, simple 'XOR' is used to generate the final key:
> > > >
> > > > case KEYID_SET_KEY_RANDOM:
> > > > ......
> > > > (* Mix user supplied entropy to the data key and tweak
> > > > key *)
> > > > TMP_RND_DATA_KEY = TMP_RND_KEY XOR
> > > > TMP_KEY_PROGRAM_STRUCT.KEY_FIELD_1.BYTES[15:0];
> > > > TMP_RND_TWEAK_KEY = TMP_RND_TWEAK_KEY XOR
> > > > TMP_KEY_PROGRAM_STRUCT.KEY_FIELD_2.BYTES[15:0];
> > > >
> > > > So I think we can either just remove 'entropy' parameter, since
> > > > we can use
> > >
> > > both 'userkey' and 'tweak' even for random key mode.
> > > >
> > > > In fact, which might be better IMHO, we can simply disallow or
> > > > ignore
> > >
> > > 'userkey' and 'tweak' part for random key mode, since if we allow
> > > user to specify
> > > both entropies, and if user passes value with all 1, we are
> > > effectively making the
> > > key and tweak to be all 1, which is not random anymore.
> > > >
> > > > Instead, kernel can generate random for both entropies, or we
> > > > can simply uses
> > >
> > > 0, ignoring user input.
> > >
> > > Kai,
> > > I think my typo above, threw you off. We have the same
> > > understanding of the
> > > key fields.
> > >
> > > Is this the structure you are suggesting?
> > >
> > > Options
> > >
> > > key_type= "user" or "CPU"
> > >
> > > key= If key_type == user
> > > key= is the data key
> > > If key_type == CPU
> > > key= is not required
> > > if key= is present
> > > it is entropy to be mixed with
> > > CPU generated data key
> > >
> > > tweak= If key_type == user
> > > tweak= is the tweak key
> > > If key_type == CPU
> > > tweak= is not required
> > > if tweak= is present
> > > it is entropy to be mixed with
> > > CPU generated tweak key
> >
> > Exactly.
> >
> > Although I am not sure whether we should support other 2 modes:
> > Clear key and no encryption;
>
> A hardware key does get CLEAR'ed when the userspace key is revoked.
> I don't think we identified any other user directed need to clear a
> key.
>
> The no encryption option is currently considered not a requirement.
> That means, although you see it in the Intel HW Spec, we don't have
> use case that is driving us to implement it.
>
> For other's info - no encryption would be an option where the key
> tells the hardware not to do any encryption at all on this piece of
> memory.
> All of memory not encrypted with these MKTME keys, is by default,
> encrypted
> with the system level TME, Total Memory Encryption algorithm. (OK -
> not
> really *all*, there is also a BIOS settable exclusion zone for TME)
Agreed. Let's focus on user mode and CPU mode for now.
Thanks,
-Kai
>
> >
> > Thanks,
> > -Kai
> > >
> > >
> > > Alison
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > -Kai
> > >
> > > ........snip...........
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