[PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering
Kees Cook
keescook at chromium.org
Thu Oct 11 00:18:16 UTC 2018
v5:
- redesigned to use CONFIG_LSM= and lsm= for both ordering and enabling
- dropped various Reviewed-bys due to rather large refactoring
v4:
- add Reviewed-bys.
- cosmetic tweaks.
- New patches to fully centralize LSM "enable" decisions:
LSM: Finalize centralized LSM enabling logic
apparmor: Remove boot parameter
selinux: Remove boot parameter
v3:
- add CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE and refactor resulting logic
v2:
- add "lsm.order=" and CONFIG_LSM_ORDER instead of overloading "security="
- reorganize introduction of ordering logic code
Overview:
This refactors the LSM registration and initialization infrastructure to
more centrally support different LSM types for more cleanly supporting the
future expansion of LSM stacking via the "blob-sharing" patch series. What
was considered a "major" LSM is kept for legacy use of the "security="
boot parameter, and now overlaps with the new class of "exclusive" LSMs
for the future blob sharing. The "minor" LSMs become more well defined
as a result of the refactoring.
Approach:
To better show LSMs activation some debug reporting was added (enabled
with the "lsm.debug" boot commandline option).
I added a WARN() around LSM initialization failures, which appear to
have always been silently ignored. (Realistically any LSM init failures
would have only been due to catastrophic kernel issues that would render
a system unworkable anyway, but it'd be better to expose the problem as
early as possible.)
Instead of continuing to (somewhat improperly) overload the kernel's
initcall system, this changes the LSM infrastructure to store a
registration structure (struct lsm_info) table instead, where metadata
about each LSM can be recorded (name, flags, order, enable flag, init
function). This can be extended in the future to include things like
required blob size for the coming "blob sharing" LSMs.
The "major" LSMs had to individually negotiate which of them should be
enabled. This didn't provide a way to negotiate combinations of other
LSMs (as will be needed for "blob sharing" LSMs). This is solved by
providing the LSM infrastructure with all the details needed to make
the choice (exposing the per-LSM "enabled" flag, if used, the LSM
characteristics, and ordering expectations).
As a result of the refactoring, the "minor" LSMs are able to remove
the open-coded security_add_hooks() calls for "capability", "yama",
and "loadpin", and to redefine "integrity" properly as a general LSM.
(Note that "integrity" actually defined _no_ hooks, but needs the early
initialization).
With all LSMs being proessed centrally, it was possible to implement a
new boot parameter "lsm=" to provide explicit ordering, which is helpful
for the future "blob sharing" LSMs. Matching this is the new CONFIG_LSM,
which effectively replaces CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, as it provides a
higher granularity of control.
Breakdown of patches:
Infrastructure improvements (no logical changes):
LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
LSM: Remove initcall tracing
LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
Split "integrity" out into "ordered initialization" (no logical changes):
LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR
LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization
Provide centralized LSM enable/disable infrastructure:
LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"
LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs
Provide centralized LSM ordering infrastructure:
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize
LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM
LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection
LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list
Refactor legacy "security=" handling to map to new infrastructure:
LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic
LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable
Move major LSMs into ordered initialization:
LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM
apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization
Move minor LSMs into ordered initialization:
LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM
Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM
LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order
capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST
-Kees
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +
arch/arc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux-xip.lds.S | 1 -
arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
arch/h8300/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
arch/microblaze/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 -
arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 -
arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S | 2 -
arch/xtensa/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 -
include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 25 +-
include/linux/init.h | 2 -
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 36 ++-
include/linux/module.h | 1 -
security/Kconfig | 41 +--
security/apparmor/Kconfig | 16 -
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 17 +-
security/commoncap.c | 9 +-
security/integrity/iint.c | 6 +-
security/loadpin/Kconfig | 4 +-
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 29 +-
security/security.c | 288 ++++++++++++++----
security/selinux/Kconfig | 15 -
security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 8 +-
26 files changed, 343 insertions(+), 210 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
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