[PATCH v4 6/6] tpm: ensure that the output of PCR read contains the correct digest size

Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu at huawei.com
Tue Nov 6 15:01:59 UTC 2018


This patch protects against data corruption that could happen in the bus,
by checking that that the digest size returned by the TPM during a PCR read
matches the size of the algorithm passed as argument to tpm2_pcr_read().

This check is performed after information about the PCR banks has been
retrieved.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index e2d5b84286a7..3b0b5b032901 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -187,15 +187,28 @@ struct tpm2_pcr_read_out {
 int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx,
 		  struct tpm_digest *digest_struct, u16 *digest_size_ptr)
 {
+	int i;
 	int rc;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	struct tpm2_pcr_read_out *out;
 	u8 pcr_select[TPM2_PCR_SELECT_MIN] = {0};
 	u16 digest_size;
+	u16 expected_digest_size = 0;
 
 	if (pcr_idx >= TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!digest_size_ptr) {
+		for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_active_banks &&
+		     chip->active_banks[i].alg_id != digest_struct->alg_id; i++)
+			;
+
+		if (i == chip->nr_active_banks)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		expected_digest_size = chip->active_banks[i].digest_size;
+	}
+
 	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_READ);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -215,7 +228,8 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx,
 
 	out = (struct tpm2_pcr_read_out *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
 	digest_size = be16_to_cpu(out->digest_size);
-	if (digest_size > sizeof(digest_struct->digest)) {
+	if (digest_size > sizeof(digest_struct->digest) ||
+	    (!digest_size_ptr && digest_size != expected_digest_size)) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-- 
2.17.1



More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list