[PATCH v6 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
Casey Schaufler
casey.schaufler at intel.com
Mon Nov 5 19:05:03 UTC 2018
From: Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>
Allow a complete ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED.
Disable the inappropriate privilege check in the capability code
that does incompatible locking.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler at intel.com>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 2 --
security/commoncap.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 99cfddde6a55..0b6a9df51c3b 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -331,8 +331,6 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
!ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
- if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
- return 0;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 2e489d6a3ac8..70a7e3d19c16 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
goto out;
- if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) &&
+ ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
out:
--
2.17.1
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