[RFC PATCH 6/6] ima: prevent loading firmware into a pre-allocated buffer
Luis R. Rodriguez
mcgrof at kernel.org
Fri May 4 00:10:18 UTC 2018
On Tue, May 01, 2018 at 09:48:23AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Question: can the device access the pre-allocated buffer at any time?
>
> By allowing devices to request firmware be loaded directly into a
> pre-allocated buffer, will this allow the device access to the firmware
> before the kernel has verified the firmware signature?
>
> Is it dependent on the type of buffer allocated (eg. DMA)? For example,
> qcom_mdt_load() -> qcom_scm_pas_init_image() -> dma_alloc_coherent().
>
> With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch would prevent
> loading firmware into a pre-allocated buffer.
Android folks went silent on the other thread .. Best poke them there?
Luis
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof at suse.com>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>
> Cc: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd at linaro.org>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index eb9c273ab81d..3098131f77c4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -454,6 +454,15 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> return 0;
> }
>
> + if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) {
> + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
> + pr_err("Prevent device from accessing firmware prior to verifying the firmware signature.\n");
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE_FALLBACK) {
> if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
> --
> 2.7.5
>
>
--
Do not panic
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