[RFC PATCH 2/2] security: Add mechanism to (un)load LSMs after boot time
casey at schaufler-ca.com
Mon Mar 26 21:46:04 UTC 2018
On 3/26/2018 2:10 PM, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 2:04 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 3/26/2018 1:24 PM, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
>>> On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 1:17 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa at huawei.com> wrote:
>>>> On 26/03/18 22:24, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
>>>>> This patch introduces a mechanism to add mutable hooks at the end of the
>>>>> callback chain for each LSM hook. It allows for built-in kernel LSMs
>>>>> to be unloaded, as well as modular LSMs to be loaded after boot-time.
>>>>> It also does not compromise the security of hooks which are never
>>>>> meant to be unloaded.
>>>> Looking at this from the perspective of really convincing people to use
>>>> other modules, there is a problem, imho.
>>>>> * Register with LSM
>>>>> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
>>>>> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack",
>>>>> + false);
>>>> Hardcoding what is (im)mutable will never satisfy everyone.
>>>> If, instead, this decision was delegated to the kernel command line, it
>>>> would be possible to have any module to become immutable -or not-
>>>> depending on the default values and the configuration received at boot.
>>>> A distro could ship with its defaults and then any user could
>>>> reconfigure it, without having to recompile or install anything, just
>>>> editing the command line.
>>> Today, the only "mutable" module we have is SELinux.
>> Paul Moore has threatened to remove the "mutable" option from
>> SELinux should it bump up high enough on his priority list.
>> The conditions under which you can disable SELinux are very
>> limited, you can't unload it after the policy has been loaded.
>>> It has a kernel
>>> config flag which determines if it is unloadable (mutable) or not. If
>>> you look at the patchset, it, in fact, sets mutability based on that
>>> config flag:
>>> - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
>>> + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux",
>>> + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE));
>>> Similarly, modules can change this behaviour based on their own
>>> choices, whether that be config flags, boot parameters, or similar. In
>>> my opinion, most LSMs should never be unloadable. In fact, we don't
>>> really have a safe way (in this patchset) to unload the security
>>> modules' code safely. Doing this would either require usage of (s)rcu,
>>> or a similar concurrency control mechanism.
>> If you can't safely unload the code, what is the point of making
>> a module unloadable? Start every hook with:
> Ask the SELinux folk?
SELinux can safely unload the hooks because they limit the ability
to unload to a point before they've started allocating data. They
aren't proud of it. I seriously doubt they'd have if if you could
run will a NULL policy.
>> if (!gonkulator_enabled)
>> return appropriately;
>> and provide mechanism for flipping the switch.
> I intend to eventually follow-up this patch with a way to safely
> unload the code, but I'd prefer to get (safe) dynamic *hooking* and
> *unhooking* first, and then later on we can make it so the code can
> get unloaded.
Unless you want to restrict the unhooking and unloading to a point
where no data has been allocated by the module it's going to be
difficult to argue that it's safe to unhook and/or unload a module.
Sure, SELinux has that restriction, but the use case is a bit
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