[PATCH v3 2/4] ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in a "secure"
> environment, with a correctly enforced security policy, which is willing
> to assume the inherent risk of specific fuse filesystems that are well
> defined and properly implemented.
> 
> As there is no way for the kernel to detect file changes, the kernel
> ignores the cached file integrity results and re-measures, re-appraises,
> and re-audits the file.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos at szeredi.hu>
> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee at canonical.com>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm at xmission.com>
> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu at kinvolk.io>
> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban at kinvolk.io>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>

> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 13 +++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index a5d225ffc388..f550f25294a3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
>  #include <linux/xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/iversion.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
>  
>  #include "ima.h"
>  
> @@ -230,9 +231,17 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>  				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
>  				 IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
>  
> -	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
> -		/* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */
> +	/*
> +	 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
> +	 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem.
> +	 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.)
> +	 */
> +	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
> +	    ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
> +	     !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER))) {
>  		iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
> +		iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
> +	}
>  
>  	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
>  	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
> -- 
> 2.7.5
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