[RFC 0/5] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions
James.Bottomley at HansenPartnership.com
Sat Mar 10 18:29:40 UTC 2018
On Sat, 2018-03-10 at 14:49 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, 2018-03-07 at 15:29 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> > By now, everybody knows we have a problem with the TPM2_RS_PW easy
> > button on TPM2 in that transactions on the TPM bus can be
> > intercepted
> > and altered. The way to fix this is to use real sessions for HMAC
> > capabilities to ensure integrity and to use parameter and response
> > encryption to ensure confidentiality of the data flowing over the
> > TPM
> > bus.
> > This RFC is about adding a simple API which can ensure the above
> > properties as a layered addition to the existing TPM handling code.
> > Eventually we can add this to the random number generator, the PCR
> > extensions and the trusted key handling, but this all depends on
> > the
> > conversion to tpm_buf which is not yet upstream, so I've
> > constructed a
> > second patch which demonstrates the new API in a test module for
> > those
> > who wish to play with it.
> > This series is also dependent on additions to the crypto subsystem
> > to
> > fix problems in the elliptic curve key handling and add the Cipher
> > FeedBack encryption scheme:
> > https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=151994371015475
> > In the second version, I added security HMAC to our PCR extend and
> > encryption to the returned random number generators and also
> > extracted
> > the parsing and tpm2b construction API into a new file.
> > James
> Might take up until end of next week before I have time to try this
> out.Anyway, I'll see if I get this running on my systems before at
> the code that much.
OK, you might want to wait for v3 then. I've got it working with
sealed (trusted) keys, well except for a problem with the trusted keys
API that means we can't protect the password for policy based keys. I
think the API is finally complete, so I'll send v3 as a PATCH not an
The point of the last patch is to show the test rig for this I'm
running in a VM using an instrumented tpm2 emulator to prove we're
getting all the correct data in and out (and that the encryption and
hmac are working); more physical TPM testing would be useful ..
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