[PATCH] exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
Kees Cook
keescook at chromium.org
Fri Mar 9 19:07:36 UTC 2018
The LSM check should happen after the file has been confirmed to be
unchanging. Without this, we could have a ToCToU issue between the
LSM verification and the actual contents of the file later.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
---
Only loadpin and SELinux implement this hook. From what I can see, this
won't change anything for either of them. IMA calls kernel_read_file(),
but looking there it seems those callers won't be negatively impacted
either. Can folks double-check this and send an Ack please?
---
fs/exec.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 7eb8d21bcab9..a919a827d181 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -895,13 +895,13 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
+ ret = deny_write_access(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = deny_write_access(file);
+ ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto out;
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size) {
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list