[PATCH 01/13] selinux: Cleanup printk logging in conditional
Joe Perches
joe at perches.com
Tue Jun 12 14:38:00 UTC 2018
On Tue, 2018-06-12 at 10:09 +0200, Peter Enderborg wrote:
> Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
I believe it would be nicer to remove the
"SELinux: " prefix embbeded in each format
and use a specific
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SELinux: " fmt
to automatically prefix these formats.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
[]
> @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
> if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
> node->cur_state = new_state;
> if (new_state == -1)
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
> + pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
> /* turn the rules on or off */
> for (cur = node->true_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
> if (new_state <= 0)
So, for instance, this patch could become:
(etc and so forth for each patch in this series)
---
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index c91543a617ac..e96820d92b61 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SELinux: " fmt
+
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
@@ -96,7 +98,7 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
node->cur_state = new_state;
if (new_state == -1)
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+ pr_err("expression result was undefined - disabling all rules\n");
/* turn the rules on or off */
for (cur = node->true_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
if (new_state <= 0)
@@ -287,7 +289,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
*/
if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
+ pr_err("type rule already exists outside of a conditional\n");
goto err;
}
/*
@@ -302,7 +304,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
if (node_ptr) {
if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
+ pr_err("too many conflicting type rules\n");
goto err;
}
found = 0;
@@ -313,13 +315,13 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
}
}
if (!found) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
+ pr_err("conflicting type rules\n");
goto err;
}
}
} else {
if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
+ pr_err("conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true\n");
goto err;
}
}
@@ -327,7 +329,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
if (!node_ptr) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
+ pr_err("could not insert rule\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
@@ -387,12 +389,12 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
{
if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+ pr_err("conditional expressions uses unknown operator\n");
return 0;
}
if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+ pr_err("conditional expressions uses unknown bool\n");
return 0;
}
return 1;
--
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