[PATCH 08/32] smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks [ver #9]
Casey Schaufler
casey at schaufler-ca.com
Tue Jul 10 23:13:50 UTC 2018
On 7/10/2018 3:42 PM, David Howells wrote:
> Implement filesystem context security hooks for the smack LSM.
>
> Question: Should the ->fs_context_parse_source() hook be implemented to
> check the labels on any source devices specified?
Checking the label on a block device when doing a mount
is just going to end in tears. If you're remounting from
an already mounted filesystem it might make sense to check
that the new mount doesn't provide greater access than the
existing mount. If the original mount has smackfsdefault="_"
I could see prohibiting the additional mount having
smackfsdefault="*" on a filesystem that doesn't support
xattrs. But that requires that a (hopefully) privileged
process be involved, and we expect them to have a clue.
So no, I don't see it necessary.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>
> cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
> ---
>
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 309 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 7ad226018f51..39780b06469b 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
> #include <linux/shm.h>
> #include <linux/binfmts.h>
> #include <linux/parser.h>
> +#include <linux/fs_context.h>
> #include "smack.h"
>
> #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
> @@ -521,6 +522,307 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Mount context operations
> + */
> +
> +struct smack_fs_context {
> + union {
> + struct {
> + char *fsdefault;
> + char *fsfloor;
> + char *fshat;
> + char *fsroot;
> + char *fstransmute;
> + };
> + char *ptrs[5];
> +
> + };
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
> + struct inode_smack *isp;
> + bool transmute;
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_fs_context_free - Free the security data from a filesystem context
> + * @fc: The filesystem context to be cleaned up.
> + */
> +static void smack_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
> +{
> + struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security;
> + int i;
> +
> + if (ctx) {
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->ptrs); i++)
> + kfree(ctx->ptrs[i]);
> + kfree(ctx->isp);
> + kfree(ctx->sbsp);
> + kfree(ctx);
> + fc->security = NULL;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_fs_context_alloc - Allocate security data for a filesystem context
> + * @fc: The filesystem context.
> + * @reference: Reference dentry (automount/reconfigure) or NULL
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
> + */
> +static int smack_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc,
> + struct dentry *reference)
> +{
> + struct smack_fs_context *ctx;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
> + struct inode_smack *isp;
> + struct smack_known *skp;
> +
> + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!ctx)
> + goto nomem;
> + fc->security = ctx;
> +
> + sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!sbsp)
> + goto nomem_free;
> + ctx->sbsp = sbsp;
> +
> + isp = new_inode_smack(NULL);
> + if (!isp)
> + goto nomem_free;
> + ctx->isp = isp;
> +
> + if (reference) {
> + if (reference->d_sb->s_security)
> + memcpy(sbsp, reference->d_sb->s_security, sizeof(*sbsp));
> + } else if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
> + /* Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller. */
> + skp = smk_of_current();
> + sbsp->smk_root = skp;
> + sbsp->smk_default = skp;
> + } else {
> + sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
> + sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
> + sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
> + sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
> + /* SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. */
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +nomem_free:
> + smack_fs_context_free(fc);
> +nomem:
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
> + * @fc: The new filesystem context.
> + * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
> + */
> +static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
> + struct fs_context *src_fc)
> +{
> + struct smack_fs_context *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
> + int i;
> +
> + dst = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!dst)
> + goto nomem;
> + fc->security = dst;
> +
> + dst->sbsp = kmemdup(src->sbsp, sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!dst->sbsp)
> + goto nomem_free;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dst->ptrs); i++) {
> + if (src->ptrs[i]) {
> + dst->ptrs[i] = kstrdup(src->ptrs[i], GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!dst->ptrs[i])
> + goto nomem_free;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +nomem_free:
> + smack_fs_context_free(fc);
> +nomem:
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_fs_context_parse_option - Parse a single mount option
> + * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
> + * @opt: The option text buffer.
> + * @len: The length of the text.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
> + */
> +static int smack_fs_context_parse_option(struct fs_context *fc, char *p, size_t len)
> +{
> + struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security;
> + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> + int rc = -ENOMEM;
> + int token;
> +
> + /* Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values. */
> + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> + token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
> + switch (token) {
> + case Opt_fsdefault:
> + if (ctx->fsdefault)
> + goto error_dup;
> + ctx->fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
> + if (!ctx->fsdefault)
> + goto error;
> + break;
> + case Opt_fsfloor:
> + if (ctx->fsfloor)
> + goto error_dup;
> + ctx->fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
> + if (!ctx->fsfloor)
> + goto error;
> + break;
> + case Opt_fshat:
> + if (ctx->fshat)
> + goto error_dup;
> + ctx->fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
> + if (!ctx->fshat)
> + goto error;
> + break;
> + case Opt_fsroot:
> + if (ctx->fsroot)
> + goto error_dup;
> + ctx->fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
> + if (!ctx->fsroot)
> + goto error;
> + break;
> + case Opt_fstransmute:
> + if (ctx->fstransmute)
> + goto error_dup;
> + ctx->fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
> + if (!ctx->fstransmute)
> + goto error;
> + break;
> + default:
> + pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
> + goto error_inval;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +error_dup:
> + pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount option\n");
> +error_inval:
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> +error:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_fs_context_validate - Validate the filesystem context security data
> + * @fc: The filesystem context.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
> + */
> +static int smack_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
> +{
> + struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = ctx->sbsp;
> + struct inode_smack *isp = ctx->isp;
> + struct smack_known *skp;
> +
> + if (ctx->fsdefault) {
> + skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fsdefault, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(skp))
> + return PTR_ERR(skp);
> + sbsp->smk_default = skp;
> + }
> +
> + if (ctx->fsfloor) {
> + skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fsfloor, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(skp))
> + return PTR_ERR(skp);
> + sbsp->smk_floor = skp;
> + }
> +
> + if (ctx->fshat) {
> + skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fshat, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(skp))
> + return PTR_ERR(skp);
> + sbsp->smk_hat = skp;
> + }
> +
> + if (ctx->fsroot || ctx->fstransmute) {
> + skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fstransmute ?: ctx->fsroot, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(skp))
> + return PTR_ERR(skp);
> + sbsp->smk_root = skp;
> + ctx->transmute = !!ctx->fstransmute;
> + }
> +
> + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_sb_get_tree - Assign the context to a newly created superblock
> + * @fc: The new filesystem context.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
> + */
> +static int smack_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> +{
> + struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = ctx->sbsp;
> + struct dentry *root = fc->root;
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
> + struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb;
> + struct inode_smack *isp;
> + bool transmute = ctx->transmute;
> +
> + if (sb->s_security)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
> + /*
> + * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
> + * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
> + * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
> + */
> + if (fc->user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
> + sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
> + sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
> + transmute = true;
> + sbsp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + sbsp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
> + sb->s_security = sbsp;
> + ctx->sbsp = NULL;
> +
> + /* Initialize the root inode. */
> + isp = inode->i_security;
> + if (isp == NULL) {
> + isp = ctx->isp;
> + ctx->isp = NULL;
> + inode->i_security = isp;
> + } else
> + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
> +
> + if (transmute)
> + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
>
> /*
> * Superblock Hooks.
> @@ -4647,6 +4949,13 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
>
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_alloc, smack_fs_context_alloc),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_free, smack_fs_context_free),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_option, smack_fs_context_parse_option),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_validate, smack_fs_context_validate),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_get_tree, smack_sb_get_tree),
> +
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
>
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list