[PATCH 2/2] ima: turn on force option for FUSE in builtin policies
Dongsu Park
dongsu at kinvolk.io
Tue Jan 16 10:47:26 UTC 2018
Hi,
On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 8:09 PM, kbuild test robot <lkp at intel.com> wrote:
> [auto build test ERROR on linus/master]
> [also build test ERROR on v4.15-rc7 next-20180112]
> [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
As already mentioned in the commit message, this patch depends on
patches that are not yet in the mainline, or not even in next-integrity.
So please make it excluded from kbuild.
Thanks,
Dongsu
> url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Dongsu-Park/turn-on-force-option-for-FUSE-in-builtin-policies/20180115-015830
> config: xtensa-allmodconfig (attached as .config)
> compiler: xtensa-linux-gcc (GCC) 7.2.0
> reproduce:
> wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
> chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
> # save the attached .config to linux build tree
> make.cross ARCH=xtensa
>
> All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:130:74: error: 'IMA_FORCE' undeclared here (not in a function); did you mean 'IMA_FUNC'?
> {.action = MEASURE, .fsmagic = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FORCE},
> ^~~~~~~~~
> IMA_FUNC
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:158:73: error: invalid operands to binary | (have 'int' and 'struct ima_rule_entry *')
> {.action = APPRAISE, .fsmagic = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FORCE},
> ^
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:29:21: warning: initialization makes integer from pointer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]
> #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
> ^
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:158:61: note: in expansion of macro 'IMA_FSMAGIC'
> {.action = APPRAISE, .fsmagic = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FORCE},
> ^~~~~~~~~~~
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:29:21: note: (near initialization for 'default_appraise_rules[14].flags')
> #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
> ^
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:158:61: note: in expansion of macro 'IMA_FSMAGIC'
> {.action = APPRAISE, .fsmagic = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FORCE},
> ^~~~~~~~~~~
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:29:21: error: initializer element is not constant
> #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
> ^
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:158:61: note: in expansion of macro 'IMA_FSMAGIC'
> {.action = APPRAISE, .fsmagic = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FORCE},
> ^~~~~~~~~~~
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:29:21: note: (near initialization for 'default_appraise_rules[14].flags')
> #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
> ^
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:158:61: note: in expansion of macro 'IMA_FSMAGIC'
> {.action = APPRAISE, .fsmagic = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FORCE},
> ^~~~~~~~~~~
>
> vim +130 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>
> 115
> 116 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
> 117 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> 118 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> 119 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> 120 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> 121 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
> 122 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
> 123 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
> 124 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
> 125 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
> 126 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
> 127 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> 128 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> 129 {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > 130 {.action = MEASURE, .fsmagic = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_FORCE},
> 131 };
> 132
>
> ---
> 0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
> https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
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