[PATCH V4 2/3] IMA: Use consistent creds

Casey Schaufler casey at schaufler-ca.com
Wed Jan 3 20:08:19 UTC 2018

On 1/3/2018 11:44 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 11:32 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 1/3/2018 10:11 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>>> The problem here is that we don't *have* the task secid for one of the
>>> cases I care about. Validating the task secid at execution time gives
>>> us the security context of the spawning process, rather than the
>>> spawned one - by the time it's committed to the task structure, it's
>>> too late to block execution, so all we have is the secid associated
>>> with the creds in the bprm structure. Obviously fixing this in a way
>>> that doesn't break your work is important, so any suggestions on how I
>>> should be fixing this? :)
>> A security module is allowed to manage either or both of
>> task and cred blobs. How a security module uses secids is
>> completely up to the module. So far, everyone is using the
>> secid to be an alias for the secctx, and the task and cred
>> are treated as (roughly) the same kind of thing. But that's
>> not guaranteed going forward. I don't know what someone
>> might want to do that would cause a problem, but people are
>> amazingly creative.
>> I'm actually more concerned with the IMA code using the audit
>> rule matching. There's an assumption that the secid from a
>> cred and a secid from a task are both acceptable to the audit
>> system. What if they aren't? It's possible that I'm just
>> being paranoid, but we're getting too many permutations
>> (audit/IMA + task/cred) for my liking.
> The idea here is that we want to be able to trigger an IMA rule
> conditionally based on the LSM context a process is running under at
> exec time. The current code does so using the secid of current, which
> means we're determining whether the new binary should be measured
> based on the security context of the task that's executing it.
> However, we want to be able to do so based on the security context of
> the task that's being executed (usecase here is that I want to measure
> anything that's executed in a privileged security context, but don't
> care about anything that's running in an unprivileged context). The
> child secid has been calculated and put in the creds that are present
> in the bprm structure, but commit_creds() hasn't been called yet and
> as a result they're not associated with the task struct. One of the
> outcomes of measurement may be to block execution, and unfortunately
> by the time commit_creds() has been called it's too late to do so.
> If we want to be able to do something conditional on the LSM context
> that a process is going to be executed under, *before* commit_creds()
> is called, is there an existing way to do so? I can rework this so we
> use the task secid for all running processes and the cred secid for
> the not-yet-running child process, but I don't know if that's
> sufficient to avoid problems in future.

It's possible that converting all the existing calls of
security_task_getsecid() to security_cred_getsecid() is the
safe approach. No one is using the task blob today, and this
would disambiguate the situation.

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