[PATCH v2 3/4] ima: fail signature verification based on policy

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> On Tue, 2018-02-27 at 16:35 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> > > This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in
> > > environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the
> > > signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for
> > > example using a pre-built kernel.
> > > 
> > > This patch defines a new builtin policy "unverifiable_sigs", which can
> > 
> > How about recalc_unverifiable_sigs?
> 
> Cute, I really like that name, but in this case we're failing the
> signature verification.
> 
> > It's long, but unverifiable_sigs
> > is  not clear about whether the intent is to accept or recalculate them.
> > 
> > (or fail_unverifiable_sigs like the flag)
> 
> Could we abbreviate it to "fail_usigs"?  Or perhaps allow both
> "fail_unverifiable_sigs" and "fail_usigs".

That sounds good.  Or fail_unverified?  But so long as 'fail' is somehow
clearly implied by the name.
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