[PATCH v2 0/4] ima: unverifiable file signatures
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Thu Feb 22 21:33:00 UTC 2018
For local filesystems, the kernel prevents files being executed from
being modified. With IMA-measurement enabled, the kernel also emits
audit "time of measure, time of use" messages for files opened for
read, and subsequently opened for write.
Files on fuse are initially measured, appraised, and audited. Although
the file data can change dynamically any time, making re-measuring,
re-appraising, or re-auditing pointless, this patch set attempts to
differentiate between unprivileged non-init root and privileged
mounted fuse filesystems.
This patch set addresses three different scenarios:
- Unprivileged non-init root mounted fuse filesystems are untrusted.
Signature verification should always fail and re-measuring,
re-appraising, re-auditing files makes no sense.
Always enabled.
- For privileged mounted filesystems in a "secure" environment, with a
correctly enforced security policy, which is willing to assume the
inherent risk of specific fuse filesystems, it is reasonable to
re-measure, re-appraise, and re-audit files.
Enabled by default to prevent breaking existing systems.
- Privileged mounted filesystems unwilling to assume the risks and
prefers to fail safe.
Enabled based on policy.
Mimi
Mimi Zohar (4):
ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
ima: fail signature verification based on policy
fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++++-
fs/fuse/inode.c | 3 +++
include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +++++
security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 +
7 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--
2.7.5
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